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RES JUDICATA As REQUISITE FOR JUSTICE
Kevin M. Clermont*
Abstract
From historical,jurisprudential,and comparative perspectives,
this Article tries to synthesize res judicata while integrating it with the
rest of law. From near their beginnings, all systems of justice have
delivered a core of res judicata comprising the substance of bar and
defense preclusion. This core is universal not because it represents a
universal value, but rather because it responds to a universal
institutional need. Any justice system must have adjudicators; to be
effective, their judgments must mean something with bindingness; and
the minimal bindingness is that, except in specified circumstances, the
disgruntled cannot undo a judgment in an effort to change the outcome.
By some formulation of rules and exceptions, each justice system
must and does deliver this core of res judicata. Fundamental fairness
imposes some distant outer limit on res judicata, too. In between those
minimal and maximal limits, context-specific policy will decide how far
res judicata will go in any particularcountry, with huge implications
for its legal system. At one extreme the United States loves preclusion,
and so it goes well beyond the bare minimum. Thus far, China sticks
close to the core. Perhaps for both of these prime examples, the optimum
lies closer to the middle.

*

Ziff Professor of Law, Cornell University. I would like to thank Zachary Clopton,

Kuo-Chang Huang, Lily Kahng, Lan Lan, John Leubsdorf, Man Li, Emily Sherwin,
Xingzhong Yu, Frank Zhang, Jing Zhang, and the participants in Cornell Law School's
summer faculty workshop for fruitful exchanges. Much of this Article's background
description of the structure of American res judicata law is drawn, sometimes almost
verbatim, from KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 5 (4th ed.
2015), which in turn drew with permission from ROBERT C. CASAD & KEVIN M.
CLERMONT, RES JUDICATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND PRACTICE (2001).
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INTRODUCTION
Res judicata appears to be another one of those procedural excesses
that seemingly overrun the United States. It is not. Rather than
exemplifying American exceptionalism, it is omnipresent. This Article
will try to explain the res judicata law that every legal system has, had,
and should have in place.
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Res judicata law answers the unavoidable question of what impact
a previously rendered adjudication has in subsequent disputes, a
question of both practical and systemic importance. In particular, in
what circumstances and to what extent should courts give preclusive
effects to a judgment, in respect of its being the judicial branch's endproduct?1 The answer comes as a specified degree of finality that will
yield a specified extent of preclusion. Res judicata's motivation in
decreeing finality lies in the phrase interest reipublicae Ut sit finis
litium, which translates to "it is in the interest of the State that there
be an end to litigation." Its modality in decreeing preclusion lies in the
phrase res judicatapro veritate accipitur,which translates as "a matter
adjudged is taken as the truth."
The theme herein will be that all systems of justice deploy a core of
res judicata that forbids routinely undoing the judgment itself, and
have done so over the centuries (Part I) pursuant to a jurisprudence
that transcends all borders (Part II).2 In any particular country, the law
has varied as to how much farther it goes in extending res judicata
(Part III). The United States has gone far (Part IV), while China has
not (Part V). Indeed, these two countries mark the ends of the spectrum
of the developed world's res judicata laws. The United States has
reintroduced a note of exceptionalism with its expansiveness. 3 China is
grudging: as any country strives toward establishing the rule of law, 4 it
will encounter controversy regarding the topic of res judicata; but the
question it faces is not whether it should adopt res judicata, but only
the contentious question of how far it should go with the idea.

1. Other doctrines, such as stare decisis and double jeopardy, supplement res
judicata to form the more general topic of "former adjudication." See ROBERT C. CASAD &
KEVIN M. CLERMONT, RES JUDIcATA: A HANDBOOK ON ITS THEORY, DOCTRINE, AND

PRACTICE 13-19, 22-27 (2001). Other doctrines, such as those that treat entering,
amending, attacking, satisfying, and enforcing judgments, join former adjudication to
form the still more general topic of "judgments." See 2 A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE
LAW OF JUDGMENTS §§ 546-560, at 1165-264 (Edward W. Tuttle ed., 5th ed. 1925) (1873).
2. These contentions are basic to all of res judicata. Accordingly, although res
judicata has very broad application, I can defend the contentions while pretty much
confining discussion to the effects of a personal and coercive judgment rendered by a court
in a civil case. In rem and declaratory judgments are subject to specialized res judicata
provisions. Likewise, criminal judgments, administrative adjudications, and arbitration
awards have res judicata effects. See CASAD & CLERMONT, supranote 1, at 196-209.
3. See infra Part IV.
4. See TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 6-7 (2010); KATRIN BLASEK, RULE OF LAW IN
CHINA: A COMPARATIvE APPROACH 1 (2015); JOHN W. HEAD, CHINA'S LEGAL SOUL: THE
MODERN CHINESE LEGAL IDENTITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT 59-63, 105-61, 188-89 (2009);
Mortimer N.S. Sellers, What Is the Rule of Law and Why Is It So Important, in THE LEGAL
DOCTRINES OF THE RULE OF LAw AND THE LEGAL STATE (RECHTSSTAAT) 3, 3-4 (James R.
Silkenat et al. eds., 2014).

1070

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW[Vol. 68:1067

To get started, I should impart some legal background and a bit of
introductory vocabulary. Any res judicata law would entail (1) limits on
collateral attacks on and other relief from judgments outside the
ordinary course of review in the initial action's trial and appellate
courts and (2) at least some stunted version of preclusion rules
applicable to final judgments. 5 The former, in setting a valid judgment
as the prerequisite to preclusion, gives the limited circumstances in
6
which the bound party can set aside a judgment other than by appeal.
The latter set of rules expresses the outer extent of preclusion, (3) while
exceptions to the rules constitute the permitted escapes from
preclusion. 7 Thus the law runs: if a judgment is valid and final, it will
have preclusive effects to a specified degree, unless exceptional
8
circumstances prevail.
As to the actual content of a country's res judicata-prerequisite of
a valid and final judgment; rules of preclusion; and exceptions to
preclusion-the contention is that every justice system has provided at
least a core that prohibits routinely undoing the judgment. This
mandatory core of res judicata may comprise a degree of either claim
preclusion or issue preclusion.
Claim preclusion is the part of res judicata that would typically say
a party may not, outside the context of the initial action, relitigate a
claim decided therein by a valid and final judgment, subject to certain
exceptions. As a verbal matter, many countries seem to operate without
claim preclusion; where the doctrine exists, a judgment will extinguish
the whole claim, precluding all matters within the claim that were or
could have been litigated in that initial action. Claim preclusion
subdivides into three subparts: (1) If the judgment in the initial action
was in the defendant's favor, the plaintiff's claim is said to be barred by
the judgment. Bar says that the plaintiff generally cannot bring a
second action on the claim in the hope of winning this time. (2) If the
judgment in the initial action was in the plaintiffs favor, the plaintiffs
claim is said to merge in the judgment. Merger says that the plaintiff
generally cannot bring a second action on the claim in the hope of
winning a more favorable judgment. (3) However, the plaintiff can seek
to enforce the favorable judgment, and the defendant cannot then raise
defenses that were or could have been interposed in that initial action.
Defense preclusion is the subdoctrine that generally precludes the losing

5.
6.

See KEVIN M. CLERMONT, PRINCIPLES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 381-86 (4th ed. 2015).

7.
8.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
DAVID L. SHAPIRO, CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRECLUSION IN CIVIL ACTIONS 14 (2001).

Id.
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defendant from later asserting mere defenses to the claim. 9
Issue preclusion is the part of res judicata that says, outside the
context of the initial action, regardless of who won the judgment, a
party generally may not relitigate any issue of fact or law if its
determination was essential to a valid and final judgment,1 0 subject to
exceptions.1 1 Issue preclusion sees variation across the countries that
employ it. Under the U.S. view, issue preclusion should reach only
matters that were actually litigated and determined, unlike claim
preclusion which reaches even matters that could have been, but were
not, litigated; most countries do not require actual litigation and
determination, which allows issue preclusion to play the role of claim
preclusion for them. 12 Issue preclusion subdivides as well: (1) If the
second action is on the same claim as the initial action, then the
applicable variety of issue preclusion is direct estoppel. (2) If the second
action is on a different claim, then the applicable variety of issue
preclusion is collateral estoppel. In fact, most foreign countries do not
employ collateral estoppel, because this extension of res judicata goes
beyond the necessary in order to pursue preclusion for the sake of
efficiency and other perceived policies. 13
I. HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF RES JUDICATA
Res judicata is old. For example, some commentators have
suggested "roots" of Anglo-American res judicata going back far. 14 One
can find these roots in various ancient systems, importantly including
preclusion in the Germanic estoppel by record of Anglo-Saxon times that
looked to the party's behavior 15 and in the later-arriving Roman res

9. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
10. Id. § 27.
11. Id.§ 28.
12. See infra Section II.B.
13. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of Foreign
Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. REV. 1601, 1676 (1968)
("It follows a fortiori that the German system does not recognize any collateral estoppel
effects whatsoever.").
14. See ALLAN D. VESTAL, RES JUDICATAJPRECLUSION V-17 to -18 (1969).
15. See Robert Wyness Millar, The Historical Relation of Estoppel by Record to Res
Judicata,35 ILL. L. REV. 41, 52-53 (1940) (suggesting that the Germanic idea led to issue
preclusion, although today issue preclusion rests on the judgment itself rather than the
party's behavior, while the Roman idea eventually permitted evolution in some countries
from issue preclusion to claim preclusion). The word "estoppel" comes from the Old
French word for bung or stopper plug (estoupail). As Sir Edward Coke explained, "it is
called an estoppel or conclusion, because a man's owne act or acceptance stoppeth or
closeth up his mouth to alleage or plead the truth." 2 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF
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judicata that looked instead to the judgment's effect as instantiating
the truth. 16 But in reality these were inspirational analogies, acting
more as borrowed verbal formulations rather than transplants or true
roots. Other than in colonization-like transitions, each legal system
seems to generate internally its own res judicata law through its courts,
often doing so independently in response to its own felt need for judicial
finality and often ending up in a unique spot. In this sense, res judicata
17
"is as old as the law itself."
True, in England one did not hear much talk of res judicata in the
very early days of a disorganized court system and undeveloped recordkeeping. But soon English courts saw the need for some finality so that
their judgments meant something, and notions akin to res judicata
started to emerge.' 8 By the 1200s Bracton recognized that the principle
of res judicata lay in English cases. 19 From those beginnings the
English law of res judicata developed, with little reference to the foreign
analogies. 20 In the ensuing centuries, the courts revised and
complexified the doctrine. For example, in connection with Ferrer v.
Arden, Edward Coke as reporter explained in 1598:
For as it hath been well said Interest reipub. ut sit finis
litium; otherwise great oppression might be done under colour
and pretence of law; for if there should not be an end of suits,
then a rich and malicious man would infinitely vex him who
hath right by suits and actions; and in the end (because he
cannot come to an end) compel him (to redeem his charge and
vexation) to leave and relinquish his right, all which was
remedied by the rule and reason of the ancient common law, the
neglect of which rule... hath therewith introduced four great
inconveniences. 1. Infiniteness of verdicts, recoveries, and

THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND; OR, A COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON § 667, at

352a (London, J. & W.T. Clarke, 19th ed. 1832) (1628).
16. See KR. HANDLEY, SPENCER BOWER AND HANDLEY: RES JUDICATA 324-25 (4th ed.
2009) ('"The Roman rule [which required the same parties and the same 'ground of
complaint ] did not distinguish between the effect of a res judicata as a bar to
contradiction, and as a bar to repetition, but was a general prohibition against reopening
the res judicata,in any form, and for any purpose.").
17. Marsh v. Pier, 4 Rawle 273, 288 (Pa. 1833).
18.

See GEORGE SPENCER BOWER & ALEXANDER KINGCOME TURNER, THE DOCTRINE

OF RES JUDICATA 149 (2d ed. 1969).
19.

E.g., 3 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 296 (Samuel E. Thorne

trans., 1977) (c. 1260) ('The assise also falls if the demandant claims by assise what he
lost by judgment, for the assise falls because of the exception of res judicata [propter
exceptionem rei iudicatae] ....
").
20.
SPENCER BOWER & TURNER, supra note 18, at 170-71.
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judgments in one and the same case. 2. Sometimes contrarieties
of verdicts and judgments one against the other. 3. The
continuance of suits for 20, 30, and 40 years, to the utter
impoverishing of the parties. 4. All this tends to the dishonour
of the common law, which utterly abhors infiniteness, and
delaying of suits; wherein is to be observed the excellency of the
common law; for the receding from the true institution of it
introduces many inconveniencies, and the observation thereof is
always accompanied with rest and quietness, the end of all
21
human laws.
This unsystematized body of the law remained shrouded in the mists,
even if some major doctrinal shifts occurred in response to shifting
policies behind res judicata. Progress was slow but fairly steadily
expansive.
Its colonies received England's res judicata law. With time,
however, the law of the United States diverged to meet the need felt
here. The fact that the English law still lay in the mists facilitated this
divergence. Slowly a distinctive, and more expansive, U.S. approach
emerged. Treatises appeared. 22 Yet courts still stumbled about.
Consequently, even the leading articles in the modernizing field were
largely attempts to get the precedents in sensible order. 23 The average
lawyer or academic gave res judicata little thought. Few perceived its
significance. The subject was not yet satisfactorily systematized, nor
theorized of course.
Res judicata's retarded development resulted from a couple of
factors. Often res judicata came up only when a litigant had taken a
misstep that mired the court in repetitive litigation, and therefore res
judicata tended to be envisaged as an arcane jumble of technical and
arbitrary provisions to handle this peculiar problem. Otherwise the res
judicata law lay scattered in the interstices of a variety of areas like (1)
collateral attacks on and other relief from judgments, 24 (2) enforcement
26
of judgments,2 5 and (3) full faith and credit or international comity.

21. (1598) 77 Eng. Rep. 263, 266, 6 Co. Rep. 7a, 9a (C.P.).
22. See, e.g., 2 HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS,
INCLUDING THE LAW OF RES JUDICATA § 500, at 759-61 (2d ed. 1902) (1891); 2 FREEMAN,
supra note 1, § 546, at 1165-68; 1 JOHN M. VAN FLEET, RES JUDICATA: A TREATISE ON THE
LAW OF FORMER ADJUDICATION 2-3 (Indianapolis, Bowen-Merril Co. 1895); J.C. WELLS, A
TREATISE ON THE DOCTRINES OF RES ADJUDICATA AND STARE DECISIS 1-9 (Des Moines,

Mills & Co. 1878).
23. E.g., Robert von Moschzisker, Res Judicata,38 YALE L.J. 299 (1929).
24. See CLERMONT, supra note 5, at 381-86.
25. See, e.g., ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS (Louis Garb & Julian Lew eds.,
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First, relief from judgments links to res judicata because only a
valid judgment has res judicata effects, and so a party can escape res
judicata by successfully attacking the validity of the prior judgment.
Although the law pigeonholes relief from judgment separately from res
judicata, the two must be studied together. The more liberal the system
is with relief from judgment, the less bite the preclusion rules will
27
have.
Second, although enforcement has recognition of the judgment as a
prerequisite, and recognition means the giving of res judicata effect, the
law on enforcement emphasizes recognition for enforcement purposes
rather than recognition for res judicata purposes. Enforcement law thus
has done little to help synthesize res judicata law.
Third, recognition and enforcement in the interjurisdictional
context involve tangential matters of res judicata, too. Ideally, conflictof-laws principles call for the rendering court's res judicata law to
define the judgment, subject of course to the second court's power to
second-guess the judgment on grounds such as public policy. 28 That is,
when the second court faces a question of the extent or reach of res
judicata based on the prior judgment, it normally should apply the res
judicata law that the rendering court would apply. The basic approach
to judgments is retroverse, in the sense of turning backward to look at
the rendering court's view of its own judgment: the second court lets the
first court's law decide what it conclusively adjudicated. 29 Therefore,
studies of full faith and credit or international comity have shed some
dim light on the details of res judicata.
The point here is that this doctrinal dispersion long distracted the
legal mind. The giant step toward consolidation and comprehension was
the American Law Institute's Restatement of Judgments in 1942, which
recognized the emergence of claim preclusion and so established a full

2013); ROBERT E. LUTZ, A LAWYER'S HANDBOOK FOR ENFORCING FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES AND ABROAD 5-9 (2007).

26.
27.

See CLERMONT, supra note 5, at 425-37, 440-52.
See Albrecht Zeuner & Harald Koch, Effects of Judgments (Res Judicata), in 16

INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 9-16 to -17

(Mauro Cappelletti ed., 2014).
28. See RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE § 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2006);
CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 94-97 (AM. LAW INST. 1971) (amended
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481(1)

JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
1988); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1987);

Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion and Foreign Country Judgments: Whose Law?, 70 IOWA
L. REV. 53, 70-76 (1984).
29. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 93, 100 (AM. LAW INST.
1971).
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doctrine of bar, merger, and collateral estoppel.3 0 The courts could now
understand what they were doing, and res judicata's coverage
immediately grew by leaps. 31 Commentators then looked at recent
judicial developments and called for doctrinal overhaul. 32 Forty years
later, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments tried to express and refine
the efforts of the federal courts and the progressive state courts. It also
embodied the modern academic approach to res judicata in the United
States, fleshing out claim and issue preclusion as the conceptual
vehicles. 33 It is unarguably a work of high quality, and it merits careful
study because it has so influenced the courts and because it has
managed to bring much order to the field. Since then, the courts have
built on the Second Restatement. In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court
in a sizable series of cases has embraced res judicata with an especially
fervent ardor. 34 As a consequence of this judicial gloss on the Second
Restatement, a coherent and very expansive modern law of res judicata
has become perceptible and accepted. Indeed, the United States today
enjoys a semi-codification of most of res judicata law, one that is fairly
uniform, albeit unofficial. Certain pockets and details of the law remain

30. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS §§ 47-48, 68 (AM. LAW INST. 1942); Austin
Wakeman Scott, CollateralEstoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1942) ('In [the
Restatement of Judgments] we have not dealt with the numerous questions of mere
procedure which are commonly included in the text books and digests and encyclopedias
under the heading of 'Judgments.'... We have limited our treatment to the effect of
judgments upon subsequent controversies. In other words, we have dealt with the
doctrine of res judicata.").
31. E.g., Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 122 P.2d 892, 893-95
(Cal. 1942) (endorsing nonmutual collateral estoppel, while the Restatement was still in
draft).
32. E.g., VESTAL, supra note 14, at V-36 to -42; Developments in the Law-Res
Judicata,65 HARV. L. REV. 818, 820 (1952).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
34. E.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S.Ct. 1293, 1302-06 (2015)
(extending preclusion running from administrative agencies to courts); Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375 (1996) (extending state-to-federal issue
preclusion, even for cases within exclusive federal jurisdiction); Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott,
478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986) (endorsing preclusion from administrative agencies to
courts); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1984)
(extending state-to-federal preclusion); Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 476
(1982) (endorsing state-to-federal preclusion); Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452
U.S. 394, 401-02 (1981) (rejecting loose exceptions to claim preclusion, like "simple
justice" and "public policy," despite appealing facts); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 10405 (1980) (extending criminal-to-civil preclusion); Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
162-64 (1979) (taking narrow view of exceptions to issue preclusion); Parklane Hosiery
Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-33 (1979) (endorsing offensive nonmutual collateral
estoppel); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324-25 (1971)
(endorsing defensive nonmutual collateral estoppel).
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unsettled, of course. There remain variations state by state. But most of
the big questions are settled for the time being.
The reason for the sudden growth of U.S. res judicata lies in the
peculiar context of the local litigation system. The growth came during
the period of liberalization of pleading, joinder, and discovery. Now res
judicata could with fairness be more demanding as the parties'
opportunities to express their position in the initial action grew. More
significantly, the expansion occurred while a national obsession with
litigiousness and dockets bloomed. 35 The Supreme Court's ardor
demonstrated a rather remarkable acceptance of simplistic notions of
efficiency and a disregard of real costs in fairness. 36 The point here is
that the actual extent of res judicata in any particular country depends
on a debatable balance of efficiency, fairness, and substantive policies.
As res judicata's reach extends, it becomes ever more a topic for
policy debate and controversy. Consequently, res judicata today seems
very significant to American legal minds. A reflection of res judicata's
significance here is its place as part of the basic curriculum in American
law schools. Res judicata is a major and critical topic in the first-year
law-school course in civil procedure; indeed, it ties the course together,
showcasing the eternal tension between validity and finality. Also,
American lawyers have come to understand the practical impact of this
doctrine. A judgment is the embodiment of what a court has decided,
and res judicata performs the straightforward but profound mission of
delineating the scope or content of the judgment.
Less perceived, even among academics, is how an expansive res
judicata infiltrates and shapes the rest of law. Within procedure, an
awareness of this doctrine illuminates every topic. But its influence is
far broader. Res judicata currently reverberates into all corners of the
U.S. legal system.
First, because a judgment, as defined by res judicata law, is the
primary and climatic objective of most adjudicative proceedings, a
knowing eye trained on res judicata will greatly affect the party's
implementation of procedure, both way before and way after judgment.
From composing pleadings in an initial lawsuit to settling or otherwise
ending the case and then to attacking the judgment whether by appeal
or in a second lawsuit, the party must bear res judicata in mind.

35. See Maurice J. Holland, Modernizing Res Judicata Reflections on the Parklane
Doctrine, 55 IND. L.J. 615, 616-20 (1980) (mentioning also the shift from formalism to
treatment of res judicata as public law).
36. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 34.
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Second, at a more profound level, res judicata operates as much
more than a mere part of the technical rules on the conduct of litigation.
It is essential to judicial operation, to the orderly working of the judicial
branch. If disputants could just reopen adjudicated disputes, there
would be no end to the case, nor any beginning of judicial authority.
Third, as to courts' structure, res judicata implies at least some
respect for prior adjudication across the whole judicial branch. Without
such respect, the more powerful courts would inevitably extinguish
their competitors. If disputants could reopen their disputes in the
superior court, they would come to skip over the inferior court. The
royal courts in England prevailed over the local courts in part through
their willingness to allow litigation anew. Contrariwise, the continued
thriving of state and federal courts in the United States is owing to a
healthy doctrine of res judicata.
Fourth, res judicata, being the law that specifies what a judgment
decides and what it does not decide, shores up separationof powers by
setting the boundaries on the output of the judicial branch of
government. It is res judicata law that restrains the applicability of
judicial decisions to nonparties and the retroactivity of legal change to
already adjudicated matters. Because res judicata thus determines how
a judgment differs from legislation and administration, the doctrine
plays a basic role in understanding the governmental system.
Meanwhile, res judicata offers protection from inroads in the other
direction. It helps to ensure judicial independence by prohibiting the
37
other branches from overturning judgments.
Fifth, on the level of international law, res judicata might not be
absolutely necessary. The law of the jungle might suffice, because each
nation has a zone of autonomous operation. But especially today, with
ever-increasing globalization, a sensible international order commends
an international law of res judicata. The United States should, and
does, respect the judgments of France, and vice versa.
As a result, the United States increasingly recognizes the
importance of res judicata, already granting it a prominence that is
hard for the rest of world to understand. This prominence is limited to
37. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995) ("Article III
establishes a 'judicial department' with the 'province and duty... to say what the law is'
in particular cases and controversies. The record of history shows that the Framers
crafted this charter of the judicial department with an expressed understanding that it
gives the Federal Judiciary the power, not merely to rule on cases, but to decide them,
subject to review only by superior courts in the Article I hierarchy. . . . By retroactively
commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments, Congress has violated this
fundamental principle." (first alteration in original) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803))).
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the United States, however, and has prevailed only over the last few
decades. Therefore, no one has synthesized the subject while
integrating it with the rest of the law. The time remains right for a
reflective overview.
II.

JURISPRUDENTIAL BASIS OF RES JUDICATA

Given that res judicata plays a key role in procedure, judicial
operation, courts' structure, separation of powers, and international
law, it is naturally a difficult subject. Moreover, like any policy, it has
its costs as well as its benefits. As to obvious costs, one readily perceives
that litigating about whether to relitigate is inefficient, and some
applications of res judicata do seem outrageously unfair. Often
frustrated students and other victims of res judicata, after realizing its
difficulties and lamenting its costs, ask whether we would be better off
without res judicata. Yet, I contend that this question is nonsensical in
itself.
A justice system must deliver res judicata. I do grant that the
actual extent and content of res judicata can range from minimal to
extensive res judicata, and its formulation comes in many flavors. Sure,
the system could lop off some extensions and some details of res
judicata.3 8 But the essential core of res judicata is mandatory.
A. Weak Contention:Every Legal System Has a Res JudicataLaw
The jurisprudential task of synthesis and integration can begin
with a comparative overview, although documenting a comparative
review of res judicata is a challenging task postponed until the next
part of this Article. I shall now undertake to make some sweeping
comparative generalizations, and indeed I shall do so on a worldwide
basis. I begin with the seemingly bold contention that res judicata is
absolutely universal, that every legal system must have a body of res
judicata law.3 9 Although that contention would seem to require
foolhardy courage, in fact that contention is so weak as to be a truism.
A simple but elusive insight is that res judicata is nothing more or
less than the body of law that defines "judgment." Res judicata proves

38. Lee E. Berlik, Claim Preclusion, Issue Preclusion, and the Various Forms of Res
Judicata, VA. Bus. LITIG. BLOG (Sept. 17, 2015), http://www.virginiabusinesslitigation
lawyer.com/2015/09/claim-preclusion-issue-preclus.html.
39. 2 FREEMAN, supra note 1, § 627, at 1321 ("The doctrine of res judicata is a
principle of universal jurisprudence forming part of the legal systems of all civilized
nations.").
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critical in interpreting the judgment's scope. A judgment is more than a
concrete embodiment of what an adjudicator has decided. By necessity,
a judgment decides certain things and does not decide other things. Res
judicata performs its job of delineating the real content of a judgment
not only by marking what the judgment decided and what it did not
decide, but also by specifying the binding effects and noneffects of the
adjudication. It dictates whether decided matters are immune to
reopening, as well as dictating which actually undecided matters
nevertheless fall within the bounds of a judgment and so receive
treatment as if decided and which matters lie outside the boundaries of
the judgment. Therefore, res judicata serves to define judgment by
means of fixing the boundaries of the definitive judgment, even if res
judicata appears to be only an obscure jumble of rules.
This one insight informs all sorts of historical and comparative
inquiries. Res judicata's mission of delineating judgment is nonoptional.
A version of res judicata must apply to every judgment ever rendered
anywhere. Every legal system, from its very beginnings, has produced a
law of res judicata. Even if the res judicata law said a judgment has no
effects whatsoever, that would be a res judicata law. Hence, by
definition, res judicata is universal.
Yet, each jurisdiction has produced its own variation of res judicata
law. Because it is so broad in the United States, it has a special
prominence here. In other countries, the very concept of res judicata
will stay hidden until it achieves a certain breadth. In any particular
country, can the extent of preclusion really range from 0 to 100? No.
There is a required minimum. A judgment must not only say
something, it must mean something binding.
B. Strong Contention: Every Justice System Delivers Res Judicata's
Minimal Core
Empirically, every system of justice around the world, from near its
beginnings, has generated a common core of res judicata law to make
adjudications binding. "The doctrine of res judicata is a principle of
universal jurisprudence forming part of the legal systems of all civilized
nations." 40 It is this empirical observation that drives my strong
contention. But how would one explain the empirical fact?
As usually stated, the motivating rationale behind res judicata is
that at some point the pursuit of truth should and must cease: justice

40.

Id.
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demands that there be an end to litigation. This rationale involves two
different ideas.
First, an end to litigation serves the process values of fairness and
efficiency. Indulgence of the loser, who wants a redo, must sometimes
bow to fairness for the winner. Likewise, no realistic conception of
justice would call for pursuing truth or any other aim without concern
for cost:
The main purpose inherent in the concept of res judicata is to
ensure that once a matter has been decided further controversy
or uncertainty about it is eliminated. This implies on the
procedural level that the rendering of an inconsistent decision
concerning the same subject matter must be prevented. For as
long as the possibility remains that a different judgment may be
rendered in a new proceeding, legal certainty has not yet been
41
achieved and the litigation is not yet finally concluded.
As always, one must be careful with fairness and efficiency arguments,
which cut both ways against a complicated background. Moreover, each
society should decide on its own how much to pay, in terms of expense
or uncertainty, for truth and those other aims. The balance would seem
to call for no more res judicata law than some formless principle of
"enough is enough." Yet, at a minimum, this principle would result,
under almost any conceivable set of prevailing policies, in rules
providing that in the absence of contrary agreement, a losing plaintiff
cannot sue again on the same claim and a losing defendant cannot
defend it again.
Second, finality is not just an extremely good principle that serves
fairness and efficiency, it is a necessary condition for the existence of an
effective judiciary that imposes nonconsensual judgments. The parties
cannot be allowed freely to undo the judgment. But also, the courts
themselves cannot go unrestrained from unraveling a final judgment on
their own. Other courts and, even more so, nonjudicial officials cannot
regularly bestow relief from judgment:
If a final, valid judgment served only as the tribunal's advice on
how a controversy should be resolved, leaving it to other
tribunals (or even other officials) to consider the controversy

41.

Zeuner & Koch, supra note 27, § 9-25.
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anew if they and the parties wished, it would be hard even to
42
think of the initial tribunal as a "court" in the accepted sense.
Satisfying this institutional requirement will move res judicata from
formless principle to developed law. This institutional reason behind res
judicata also takes us from balanceable values to unavoidable need.
Admittedly, this need is not a need on the order of food and water.
One could imagine a legal system without finality, that is, without what
theorists think of as adjudicators who issue binding judgments. An
example might be a military legal system that allows the commander
freely to overturn any decision, in avowed pursuit of military readiness.
But such a system would be a dispute-resolution system different from
what theorists conceive as a system of justice. Another example would
be mediation, which could have a notion of res judicata but need not.
So let us just consider a "system of justice" to be one that has
developed enough to involve individualized imposition of the
substantive law by a neutral decisionmaker in accordance with
predetermined procedures and that tries to operate in a way to make
benefits outweigh costs. Every such system must adjudicate in order to
apply the law to facts. It might adjudicate in a variety of ways and in
pursuit of a variety of aims, such as truth, social harmony, political
control, or whatever. Nonetheless, every such system will face the
question of when to close the books on any one adjudication. That
question is universal.
There is an obvious tradeoff between getting things right and
getting them finished. A small system with huge resources could stand
eternally ready to reconsider thoroughly, and would do so as long as it
thought that the benefits of doing so outweighed the costs in fairness
and efficiency and any other costs. But as the system scales up, effective
operation will need to specify when enough is indeed enough. The
universal answer to the universal question will be that a judgment at
some point cannot be routinely undone.
The more critical insight is that the adjudicator needs not only to
avoid wasteful relitigation, but also needs to establish its authority
against the disgruntled. This authority is an indispensable feature of an
effective adjudicator. Other than by authorized appeal, a judgment
cannot be routinely undone by the loser, whether the judgment was
litigated or defaulted. 43 An adjudicator must be able to say to the loser

42.

SHAPIRO, supra note 8, at 14.

43.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18-19 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
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definitively, "you lose." It and others must routinely turn a deaf ear to a
request to start again, to reconsider au fond.
Relief from judgment thus cannot lie for mere error of fact or law; a
plaintiff who loses cannot sue again on the same claim, and a defendant
who loses cannot defend anew. A country could, based on its own policy
context, go much farther with the idea of res judicata. But every system
of justice must accept at least this minimal bindingness for its
judgments. Implicit in the nature of adjudication, as ordinarily
understood, is the power to give judgments that are binding.
In sum, based on observation of comparative laws and based on
theory of adjudication, the essential core of res judicata is nonoptional.
Still, I am not arguing a universal value that demands a minimal
amount of content in res judicata law, but rather a universal
institutional need for a minimal amount.
Bar. Thus emerges the intuitive principle of claim preclusion that a
44
losing plaintiff cannot sue again in the hope of winning this time. If
the judgment in the initial action was in the defendant's favor, the
plaintiffs claim is barred by the judgment. 45 A valid and final judgment
bars the claim and any further suit on it, both as to elements that were
46
asserted in the first suit and those that might have been.
The country's implementing law would have to define the
dimensions of the claim that is to be precluded. Note that I am using
"claim" here only in the sense of the scope of the thing precluded by the
doctrine of claim preclusion, not in some technical sense with which one
country or another uses the term for other purposes. Within reason the
dimensions of the thing precluded could be narrow or broad, according
to the dictates of policy as the country sees them. For example, a
country might narrowly preclude only a new action on the same legal
theory or for the same remedy based on the same right. Or instead, a
country might broadly preclude any new action arising from the same
transactional set of facts. The broader the definition of claim, the more
reach the rule of bar will have.
A rule of bar of palpable reach is not merely a desirable provision of
law. It is a mandatory provision. A justice system must provide for its
judgments to be binding in the way that bar would provide.
Defense Preclusion. Just as unarguable, although perhaps not as
obvious at first glance, is that a valid and final judgment must preclude

44.
45.
46.

See id. § 19.
Id.
Id. §§ 18-19.
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47
a losing defendant from later asserting mere defenses to the claim.
Defense preclusion's barrier to undoing judgments may seem to occupy
some arcane corner of the specialty of res judicata. But it in fact is
critical to any justice system. Most frequently, courts and parties apply
it intuitively. Although it is intuitive, it is still deeply important.
Indeed, its intuitive application proves its criticality.
Also, any judgment must somehow cut off defenses asserted
offensively. Therefore, an implication of this idea is that once a plaintiff
obtains a judgment, the defendant generally cannot bring a new action
to undo the judgment by reopening the plaintiffs claim and pushing
those defenses (whether or not a written compulsory counterclaim
provision applies in the circumstances). 48 The rule's reach is suggested
by consideration of its genesis: the defendant cannot later pursue an
action that is essentially a way to defend anew against an already
adjudicated claim.49 It applies whether or not the prior judgment is by
default; indeed, it is this rule that makes default judgments mean
something. 50
My contention goes no farther than maintaining that the substance
of bar and defense preclusion is necessary. But it goes that far. In fact,
no one disputes this need, even if people seldom acknowledge expressly
that a minimal core of res judicata must exist. Those thinkers who do
attack res judicata do not train their weapons against the core. For
example, the well-known attack on res judicata by Professor Cleary
argued that it was too punitive. 51 But his attack aimed only at merger
when applied to parties who split their cause of action along remedial
lines. 52 For such claim-splitting that employs two lawsuits to do the
work of one, he would have assessed expenses rather than cutting off
the right to recovery. 53 He made no attempt to undermine the broader
idea of preclusion. He would have preserved the rest of claim
54
preclusion, including bar, and all of America's issue preclusion.
Merger. One could argue that merger, with its prohibition on the
winning plaintiff trying to start over, 55 is necessary for a judgment
really to mean something. This position is more arguable when a

47.

See id. § 18(2).

48.

See id. § 22(2)(a)-(b).

49. Id. § 19.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Edward W. Cleary, Res JudicataReexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948).
Id. at 342-46.
Id. at 347.
See id. at 342, 346, 349-50.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18(1) (AM. LAw INST. 1982).
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plaintiff wants a new try to get an even better result, less arguable
when the plaintiff has split the claim and now wants to pursue relief on
the remainder.
Nonetheless, redoing a judgment is less serious than undoing a
judgment. While allowing the plaintiff to sue again undercuts the
fairness and efficiency of finality, it does not undermine the position of
courts. It seems that the institutional concern must be in play to make
mandatory a branch of res judicata. So, legal systems that provide a
version of merger arguably do so as a matter of policy rather than
necessity.56

Yet, most legal systems do provide a version of merger. The reason
is that the policy call is an easy one in most instances. Permitting the
plaintiff a redo would be wasteful and burdensome, with no real policy
reasons arguing in favor of it. As a system of justice would already be
providing the substance of bar and defense preclusion, symmetry alone
would counsel prohibiting the winning plaintiff from trying to start
over.
Issue Preclusion. Claim preclusion could provide all the required
core content. 57 By its terms, the losing plaintiff generally cannot sue
again on the same claim, and the losing defendant generally cannot
undo the prior judgment. The doctrine of bar would achieve the first
aim: it says the losing plaintiff cannot try again. Defense preclusion
would achieve the second: it says that the losing defendant cannot
defend anew. Bar and defense preclusion are therefore mandatory; the
rest of preclusion is not. So, if the jurisdiction goes the claim preclusion
route, any addition of issue preclusion is optional; a legal system would
add this prohibition on relitigation of issues only if the policies of
finality so inclined the lawmakers. Issue preclusion would then
constitute a separate doctrine, one that could grow to reach different
claims and even extend its benefits to persons neither parties nor
58
privies.
Nonetheless, a legal system could choose to deliver the substance of
bar and defense preclusion by embracing issue preclusion rather than
claim preclusion. That is, issue preclusion could be substituted for,
56. See Zeuner & Koch, supra note 27, § 9-26 ("However, when a plaintiff who had
been successful in asserting a partial claim is prevented from asserting further partial
claims, the main policy objective is not the avoidance of contradictory decisions. Rather, it
is the policy of concentrating all aspects of a single, controversy in one proceeding
resulting in one judgment.").
57. See PRINCIPLES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE princ. 28 (AM. LAW INST. &
UNIDROlT 2006) (choosing to rely mainly on a narrow brand of claim preclusion).
58. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 27, 29 (AM. LAW INST.
1982).
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rather than merely added to, claim preclusion. It would preclude the
loser on the issues necessarily involved in rendering judgment on the
claim. Early American law took this route before evolving toward claim
preclusion. One might suppose that this issue-preclusive approach is a
less expansive route than minimal claim preclusion. "This could be
called a minimal concept of res judicata; without it, a judgment would
not conclusively decide anything. It seems clear that the adjudicative
process would fail to serve its social and economic functions if it did not
have this minimal effect."5 9 In actuality, however, it at best is
equivalent in effect to claim preclusion, while being more awkward in
conceptualization and implementation. Issue preclusion can provide the
effect of bar if it employs a wide definition of the issue in play; if the
issue equates to the cause of action, then the plaintiff does not get
another shot by shifting the grounds of his or her suit. 60 Similarly, issue
preclusion can achieve the effect of defense preclusion by abandoning
any actually-litigated-and-determined requirement; the defendant loses
on all defensive issues, asserted or not. 61 Issue preclusion is thus able to
deliver the minimal core because without a narrow definition of issue
and without the actually-litigated-and-determined requirement, the
rules of issue preclusion and claim preclusion are indistinguishable.
Prerequisites and Exceptions. As already noted, only a valid
judgment has res judicata effects, and so a party can escape res judicata
by successfully attacking the validity of the prior judgment. But relief
from judgment should provide a corrective only for fundamental flaws,
not for mere errors. For example, relief from judgment will normally lie
for lack of notice in the initial action to the would-be bound party; but
relief should not lie for mere error of fact.6 2 The easier it is to get relief
59.

GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 608 (6th ed. 2011) (discussing

preclusion of "the issues necessarily involved in awarding the judgment').
60. See 2 FREEMAN, supra note 1, § 676, at 1426 (treating issue preclusion as
including bar); id. § 676, at 1427-28 (saying that a judgment blocks the plaintiff by being
"an absolute estoppel as to every matter that might be urged in support" if "the cause of
action in the second action is the same as that in the first action").
61. See id. § 774, at 1646 (treating issue preclusion as defense preclusion); id. § 774,
at 1648 ("The failure to interpose a defense is equivalent to interposing it and having it
overruled ...").
62. Yet validity here does not mean that a judgment possesses a checklist of
attributes. In this context, validity means that the judgment must be of sufficient quality
to withstand an attack in the form of a request for relief from judgment. That formulation
may sound circular, but it is not. Because relief from judgment lies by various procedural
techniques and ultimately rests on a discretionary balancing of equities that takes into
account the distance and time from rendition, the law cannot define the prerequisite of
validity by specifying certain attributes of judgment. Instead, it must define validity as
the outcome of a process: to be valid, a judgment must be of sufficient quality to withstand
an attack in the form of a request for relief from judgment. That is, rather than trying to
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from judgment, the less reach the rules of preclusion will have. This
line between fundamental error and mere error must be drawn to avoid
defeating the essential core of bar and defense preclusion.
A final judgment is a prerequisite for the preclusion rule to apply,
just as is the validity of the judgment.63 That is, the action must have
proceeded far enough procedurally for the law to treat its outcome as
preclusive. The more steps required before a judgment becomes final,
the less preclusion there will be. Clear analysis must separate this legal
prerequisite of a "final judgment" from the policy principle of "finality"
that posits the need for an end to litigation.
Qualifications to preclusion, stated by these prerequisites and by
any exceptions, will turn largely on policy determinations made in the
country's own context. Those qualifications, however, cannot be so
extensive as to defeat the essential core of bar and defense preclusion.
For example, a country should not provide relief from a civil judgment
on the ground of mere mistake of law.
Formulated Doctrine. Whether by claim or issue preclusion, then, a
justice system must provide the equivalent of bar and defense
preclusion. It might possibly, but not necessarily, provide for more rules
of res judicata. Whatever route and extent adopted, res judicata would
necessitate a fair amount of elaborative doctrine.
The manner of implementation of res judicata law matters. A
country could leave the law buried and obscure, delivering the minimal
core through intuitive principles. Further extensions could come from
disparate and unbounded principles like good faith. Or instead a
country could feature res judicata and formulate it in a sensible and
detailed fashion that would foster understanding. The legal system
could then optimize res judicata in a way that "enough is enough" would
not permit. The United States took the elaborative route beginning with
the Restatement of Judgments. 64 The major benefit of this route was
that it illuminated the policy choices regarding how far the United
States wanted to take res judicata beyond the mandatory core.
The precise form of a developed res judicata turns on the
jurisprudential interplay of rules and exceptions, which can further
facilitate the pursuit of justice. The formulation must reduce litigation
in the second action about the reach of res judicata, and it must
optimize litigant behavior in the first action. Here, "rule" includes
employ the more usual kind of definition by category, the law uses a so-called operational
definition, a logically sound kind of definition that specifies a process in order to define a
term.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 18 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
64.

See generally RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
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prerequisites and refers to the series of statements constituting a
general formulation of inclusion that establishes the prima facie reach
of res judicata, and "exception" includes both rule-like formulations and
case-by-case determinations but must remain exceptional in excluding
only certain special situations from the rules' reach. What is the
optimal form for most countries? Clear, simple, and rigid rules should
approximate with minimal overinclusion the outcome of the balance of
the efficiency, fairness, and substantive policies behind res judicata.
Exceptions should then work to remedy overinclusion in the particular
circumstances, but the exceptions should be small in scope even if
unavoidably flexible and considerable in number. Finally, there should
be no exceptions to exceptions, because so extending preclusion is costly
65
with few benefits.
C. Medium-Strong Contention:FairnessImposes a Maximum on Res
Judicata
If one were to analogize my four contentions to the four basic atomic
forces, I now pass from the weak and strong forces to the gravitational
force. Everywhere the doctrine of res judicata is a restrained one.
Almost nowhere does the doctrine extend so far as to raise concerns of
basic fairness. Nowhere does the doctrine spin off to dictate that any
judicial decision is binding for all time on all people.
Res judicata is the doctrine that defines a judgment, which is the
output of the judicial branch. By the nature of the judicial branch, a
judgment decides certain things and does not decide a lot of other
things. Unlike the legislature or the executive, which can act on all
citizens, the court acts against only the parties before it and a very
limited set of others. The loose demands of due process explain how
legislators and administrators can bind people and their property, even
though those people have received representation only in the loosest
sense. But strangers to the judicial proceeding (that is, those neither
parties nor privies) are allowed their separate day in court. This feature
of self-restraint flows from res judicata law, not from due process. This
feature indeed gives the judicial branch its distinctive nature. Res

65. See Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008) ("Preclusion doctrine, it should be
recalled, is intended to reduce the burden of litigation on courts and parties. 'In this area
of the law,' we agree, '"crisp rules with sharp corners" are preferable to a round-about
doctrine of opaque standards."' (citation omitted) (quoting Bittinger v. Tecumseh Prods.
Co., 123 F.3d 877, 881 (6th Cir. 1997)); LuIs DUARTE D'ALMEIDA, ALLOWING FOR
ExcEPTIONS 3-8 (2015); CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 1, at 41; Zeuner & Koch, supra

note 27, § 9-105.
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judicata thus encapsulates the essence of the judicial branch: more or
less individualized decision with limited future effects, albeit with
finality as to those effects.
Does justice impose a mandatory limit on res judicata, aside from
this institutional self-restraint? Yes. Recall that res judicata law runs
(1) if a judgment is valid and final, (2) it will have preclusive effects to a
66
If
specified degree, (3) unless exceptional circumstances prevail.
fundamental fairness were accepted as a value, it would restrain each
of the three components of the law. Therefore, the following three
restrictions on res judicata would seem appropriate to ensure its
consistency with justice.
First, it would be basically unfair to give greater effect to a
judgment than it would have at its source. The parties litigating in F-1
should know what is at stake and what the potential judgment will
mean anywhere. A person should know the detrimental effect of the
potential judgment, and the effect should not change with the
particular F-2 in which the opponent later chooses, perhaps
surprisingly, to invoke it.67 Consequently, any person to be bound ought
to be able to challenge at least the validity of the prior judgment, up to
the extent permitted in the same circumstances under the law of the
rendering court. 68
Second, if res judicata were to start to reach out toward binding
strangers, basic fairness would require that their interests were
adequately represented in the prior proceeding. 69 But that is a loose
limit. The right to a day in court does not demand the formal joinder of
every party to be affected by the judgment, now or later. For instance,
once an issue relating to an interest in real property has been fully
litigated between the title owner and another party, the issue is settled
against later purchasers or devisees; also under current law, a
beneficiary may be bound on issues litigated by the trustee. Nonparties,
then, may be bound. All that basic fairness guarantees is a full and fair
day in court enjoyed in person or through an adequate representative.
Without that qualification, the right to a "day in court" is but a
misleading slogan. With that qualification, it becomes apparent that

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS ch. 1 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
67. See Nelson v. Adams USA, Inc., 529 U.S. 460, 469-72 (2000) (discussing similar
due process concerns).

66.
68.

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§

481(1), 482 (AM. LAW INST. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 9293, 107 (AM. LAw INST. 1971).
69. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40-46 (1940) (imposing this requirement as a
matter of constitutional due process).
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basic fairness would allow binding many more nonparties than most
persons assume. Parenthetically, it is only the res judicata law that
normally requires a day in court before binding strangers, thereby
creating the illusion of some more fundamental day-in-court rule. Mere
representation of the stranger's interests, however adequate, does not
suffice for res judicata law.7 0 Res judicata binds by adjudication only
those nonparties closely related to the representative party or, as the
law phrases it, those in privity with a party. 7 1 Society has chosen, as
expressed in its res judicata law, to bind far fewer nonparties by
judgment than it could. The current res judicata rules represent how
far the society has chosen to go, not how far the society could go. It is
res judicata's restraint that helps sharply to distinguish adjudication
from the rest of governmental decisionmaking and to preserve its
distinctive nature.
Third, all persons to be bound by claim or issue preclusion must
have had, in person or through an adequate representative, a full and
fair opportunity to litigate the claims and defenses or the issues in the
prior proceeding.7 2 Basic fairness would require that the law not
preclude on the basis of a judgment if the proceeding did not afford a
full and fair opportunity to litigate.
The important point here is that these outer bounds are very
distant ones. Even in the United States, res judicata law stays well
within the outer limit.
D. Medium-Weak Contention: Local Policy Fixes Extent of Res Judicata
Law
Between minimal and maximal limits, the extent of res judicata is a
matter of cost-benefit policy. Legal systems must accept the impulse of
res judicata's mandatory core content, and then they must formulate
law to implement it without violating fundamental fairness. The
remaining arena of policy is where the lawmakers fight over and
hammer out the res judicata law. It is, in a sense, where all the action
is. At that stage, the law gets uglier, but in different ways in different
systems. Most significantly, systems may differ in how far the
bindingness of res judicata should reach, as each legal system pursues
its more refined notions of justice.

70. See Taylor, 553 U.S. at 894.
71. See id.
72. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 480-83 (1982) (imposing this
requirement as a matter of constitutional due process).
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Res judicata is policy-driven. As a result, it has been a surprisingly
uncertain and contentious area of law. 73 Some questions of res judicata
have not been authoritatively resolved, and there is considerable
dissatisfaction with some of the solutions that have been given. Indeed,
there has been a certain basic uneasiness, even in the courts, as
exemplified by Judge Clark's aphorism: "The defense of res judicata is
universally respected, but actually not very well liked." 74 And there has
long been strong advocacy of drastic change.
Strong, but contesting, policies underlie the scope of res judicata.
The most influential values of justice here, generating a variety of
policies, are procedural efficiency and fairness. 75 Various substantive
policies, which range from optimizing market conditions to regulating
attorney-client relations, can play a role too. Obviously the range and
content of the relevant policies turn on the particulars of the local legal
system, as already mentioned. A procedural system of liberal pleading,
joinder, and discovery, on the one hand, or reliance on documentary
evidence, absence of juries, and admissibility of prior judgments as
evidence, on the other hand, will affect the system's res judicata reach.
So similarly, the role of government in the particular society and the
role of litigation in that government will shape the res judicata law.
These are policy considerations that do not affect the core but rather
influence how much farther the country goes in adopting res judicata
rules.
Under the heading of procedural efficiency, as it underlies res
judicata law, comes society's interest in avoiding the expenditure of
time and money in repetitive litigation.7 6 Society also has an interest in
avoiding any increase of uncertainty in the primary conduct of private
and public life outside the courtroom, as well as in reducing instability
in the judicial branch of the legal system. Efficiency argues for
achieving the certainty and stability of repose. Society has an interest
in avoiding possibly inconsistent adjudications, which at the least would

73. See Robert Ziff, Note, For One Litigant's Sole Relief UnforeseeablePreclusionand
the Second Restatement, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 905, 929 (1992) (noting three categories of

"unforeseeable preclusion" as (1) "expansions of issue preclusion," (2) "application of claim
preclusion even though the first court lacked authority," and (3) "application of claim
preclusion despite the intent of the prior court or the parties to the contrary").
74. Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945) (Clark, J., dissenting).
75. See Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979).
76. See, e.g., Whole Woman's Health v. Lakey, 769 F.3d 285, 301 (5th Cir.) (noting
that res judicata operates "[iln the interests of efficiency and finality"), vacated in part,
135 S. Ct. 399 (2014); Universal Ins. Co. v. Office of the Ins. Comm'r, 755 F.3d 34, 39 (1st
Cir. 2014) (limiting exceptions to res judicata so as to promote finality and efficiency).
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erode faith in the system of justice.7 7 These policies deserve
consideration in connection with both the instant case and the long run
of cases. An important efficiency consideration is the long-run deterrent
effect of res judicata: a harsh result in the case at hand might
encourage many future litigants to dispose of their disputes in a single
lawsuit, which they will take seriously.
The policies of proceduralfairness support the use of res judicata to
avoid the burdens of repetitive litigation on the party invoking the
doctrine, to avoid infringing on reliance interests, and to avoid the
possibility of the other party's causing renewed litigation or profiting
from sneaky or otherwise undesirable litigation tactics. 78 A litigant may
be entitled to a day in court, but not to inflict a repetition of it.
Contrary considerations, especially those resting on fairness in the
individual case, support exceptions to res judicata's principle of finality.
Some potential applications of the doctrine will seem deeply unfair.
After all, courts trying to pursue policies against repetitive litigation
must recognize that those policies are far from being absolute. Clearly,
other policies will often point in the other direction and sometimes
overwhelm. Iron-clad rules of preclusion hardly seem the appropriate
resolution, and so restrictions and exceptions abound.
Efficiency policies can cut the other way too. Litigating about res
judicata can be seriously inefficient. In addition to these "direct costs,"
the fear of future preclusion might stimulate overlitigation in the initial
action. Also, there are the inefficient "error costs" of deciding to live
with an incorrect judgment. Moreover, these economic arguments play
out against a complicated background. For example, the parties'
settlement in light of prior outcomes would often avoid relitigation
79
without any preclusion rule.
How do these conflicting policies balance out? With the march of
time, and across many different countries, the grand trend in the
development of res judicata has been to expand the theoretical
applicability of the finality principle.80 That is, many countries have
yielded to the call of policy to grow res judicata at least a little beyond

77. See Montana, 440 U.S. at 154 (noting that res judicata "fosters reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions").
78. Ziff, supra note 73, at 911-14.
79. See ROBERT G. BONE, CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE ECONOMICS OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
232-58 (2003).
80. See OSCAR G. CHASE ET AL., CIVIL LITIGATION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 461
(2007).
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its mandatory core of bar and defense preclusion. Most expand to
81
include merger, and some go on to provide for collateral estoppel.
At the same time, the growth of res judicata has called for
recognizing more and more exceptions of some scope and discretionary
nature. 82 On the one hand, even the many existing exceptions do not
remove all the bite from the sometimes harsh law of res judicata.8 3 On
the other hand, as exceptions continue to grow in significance, the
question arises whether the slight narrowing yielded by the exceptions
and the increasingly discretionary nature of res judicata are really
preferable to a bare but clearer minimum of preclusion, perhaps a law
that would keep judgments from being reopened but not preclude any
underlying issues. At the least, one must acknowledge that if a fuller
res judicata is deemed worth developing, it must be applied with some
woodenness in order not to defeat its purposes of economy and repose.

III. COMPARATIVE PREVALENCE OF RES JUDICATA
A comparative study will help with synthesis and integration. It
documents res judicata's common core-bar and defense preclusion,
whether delivered as claim preclusion or cloaked equivalently in issue
preclusion terminology. The core stands regardless of any extrusions
that prevail locally.
It is challenging to draw these lessons from comparative study,
however. The reason is that very little comparative work on res judicata
has been done. The standard citation is to a brief comparative foray in
some decades-old article.84 If you look at most books about foreign legal
systems and go to the index, you will find nothing on res judicata. Or go
to books on transnational litigation, and look in vain for a chapter on
res judicata.
Does this paucity suggest that res judicata is unimportant? No, it
suggests instead that comparative study of res judicata, properly done,
is very hard to do. First, countries other than the United States give the
subject little prominence. They tend to deal with it as nineteenthcentury America did, leaving it undeveloped and scattered in the
interstices of subjects like collateral attacks on and other relief from
judgments,8 5 recognition and enforcement of judgments,8 6 or even in

81.
82.
83.
84.
62.
85.

See id. at 453, 462.
See id. at 461.
See id. at 462.
E.g., Casad, supra note 28, at 61-70; see also CHASE ET AL., supra note 80, at 435See Peter E. Herzog & Delmar Karlen, Attacks on Judicial Decisions, in 16
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foreign pigeonholes like abuse of process or good faith.8 7 So the
comparativist must burrow into the foreign system, needing to
understand the whole system in order to construct its approach to res
judicata. Second, because of the absence of systemization, the law is
usually encapsulated in an idiosyncratic vocabulary in each country.
Research becomes a daunting task, even at the level of terminology.
Third, responding to felt need, each justice system has generated its
own distinctive body of res judicata law, even among countries of the
same legal family.8 8 The researcher must ascend to higher levels of
abstraction to make comparisons. Fourth, even in civil-law countries,
one cannot simply open a code. The res judicata law is mostly made by
judges, when courts are called upon to deal with a prior judgment.
Fifth, in most countries, the doctrine often proceeds case-by-case, being
on the whole somewhat flexible and therefore resistant to
generalization. Despite any first impression, it comprises principles or
flexible standards as much as fixed rules and exceptions. Sixth, the
comparativist must research a moving target because any country's res
judicata law keeps changing. It is a policy-driven subject, and the
policies are always evolving, with a general trend toward expansion of
res judicata.
I can testify personally to the difficulty of comparative study. I was
called upon to write a brief summary of French res judicata law, a
country and a language I know.8 9 The task proved challenging.
Nowhere could I find a nice comparative summary that Americans
would be able to understand. Nowhere could I find even a
noncomparative treatment of detailed French law that I could readily
understand. It was so hard to fit the French ideas into my intellectual
schema. A tremendous intellectual effort was required to master the
French law that was spread over many categories and cases and was in
the process of evolution, and then break it down to its components and
reconstruct it into a legal framework comprehensible to Americans.
I shall nevertheless attempt to document my assertions
comparatively and widely, despite the difficulties, of comparative study
of res judicata. I shall have to rely on secondary sources primarily, but I
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 8, at 3-4

(Mauro Cappelletti ed., 2014).
86. See Konstantinos D. Kerameus, Enforcement Proceedings, in 16 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW: CIVIL PROCEDURE ch. 10 (Mauro Cappelletti ed.,

2014).
87. See infra notes 100 & 121.
88. See CHASE ET AL., supra note 80, at 461.
89.

RICHARD H. FIELD ET AL., MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

774-76 (11th ed. 2014).
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defend that move on the ground that my interest is grand theme rather
than extreme detail.
I am assisted in the task by the preceding historical and
jurisprudential insights. I believe that my view-mandatory core plus
optional extensions-provides a new metric for comparative study. It
makes the world more comprehensible. It does not surrender by making
only the usual statement that res judicata varies greatly around the
world. Indeed, it almost eliminates the need for a chart of world laws.
With the new metric, res judicata falls into two camps. First, most
nations deliver the core, sometimes expressly as claim preclusion but
more often confusingly garbed as issue preclusion, and then add only a
little more res judicata in response to local conditions. These intuitive
and nearly unspoken brands of res judicata, because they are confusing
in terminology and minimal in extent, get little attention or study.
Second, in the part of the world based on English law, res judicata has
markedly expanded outward from the core. With res judicata coming
into focus there, the doctrine of issue preclusion becomes a separately
enunciated extrusion on the core. However, around the world, almost all
systems' res judicata has shown a tendency to expand in coverage over
time.
A. England and Most of Its Progeny: Issue Preclusion
English and Commonwealth 90 law on res judicata is somewhat
undersystematized. 91 It at first stayed close to the early Germanic
tradition, 92 providing that a valid and final judgment precluded a
misbehaving party on the same issue arising later: "a party to litigation
is precluded thereafter ...from denying in subsequent litigation the
correctness of a decision on a matter of law or fact given in the earlier
litigation between them." 93 England thus utilized issue preclusion
rather than claim preclusion to do most of its work of preclusion. To
complete the job, however, it had to extend this issue preclusion to
issues that were "necessary steps to the decision," sometimes even if not
actually litigated and determined and so including admitted and

90.

See Casad, supranote 28, at 62-63.

91. See PETER R. BARNETT, Preface to RES JUDICATA, ESTOPPEL, AND FOREIGN
JUDGMENTS:
THE PRECLUSIVE EFFECTS OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN PRIVATE

INTERNATIONAL LAW, at ix (2001) (referring to England's "res judicata, that delightfully
arcane yet fundamental body of law").
92. See supra text accompanying note 15.
93. SPENCER BOWER & TURNER, supra note 18, at 2-3.
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unraised matters. 94 It utilized this confusing slackness to establish
today's "cause of action estoppel" as a branch of issue preclusion that
gave bar-like effect to the cause of action and also defense preclusion
effect even to default judgments. 95 Thus, English law came to deliver
the minimal core of res judicata.
English law chose early on to add a "merger" doctrine in order to
reach the successful plaintiff trying to sue again on the same cause of
action: a valid and final judgment for the plaintiff extinguishes the
cause of action by merging it in the judgment. 96 After that step, English
res judicata for a long time resembled what would become the mid97
nineteenth-century American law, which after all came from England.
More recently, English law has gone further with another branch of
issue preclusion called "issue estoppel" in order to construct a fairly
modern doctrine of issue preclusion: a valid and final judgment
precludes issue determinations, arising anew on the same or different
cause of action, as between the same parties (and privies). 98 The
English intuit that default judgments should not produce issue estoppel
(as opposed to cause of action estoppel). 99
England is now moving to embrace preclusion even more generally
than the above-described (1) cause of action estoppel, (2) merger, and (3)
issue estoppel. It is increasingly reaching matters that could and should
have been litigated in the prior case and is beginning to allow use by
persons neither parties nor privies. 100 Thus, with its own odd

94. Id. at 37-39, 152, 157-70; cf. HANDLEY, supra note 16, at 107-12 (bringing the
description of English law up to date).
95. See SPENCER BOWER & TURNER, supra note 18, at 149 ("Its operation prevents a
party to an action from asserting or denying as against the other party the existence of a
particular cause of action the non-existence or existence of which has been determined...
."); id. at 151 (explaining that this estoppel "denies the unsuccessful defendant (or
plaintiff] the opportunity of relitigating a case which he has already lost"). Currently, the
definition of cause of action is a factual situation giving rise to a right to a particular
remedy. See BARNETT, supra note 91, at 120-21; HANDLEY, supra note 16, at 93-101.
96. See SPENCER BOWER & TURNER, supra note 18, at 355-404 ("Res judicata has a
twofold operation. Not only does it estop the parties from afterwards controverting any
question or issue thereby d6cided, but it also bars the party who has obtained relief
thereby from receiving again the same relief against the same party.").
97. See 2 FREEMAN, supra note 1, § 546, at 1165-68 (merger); id. §§ 627, 676, 774, at
1321-25, 1425-29, 1646-50 (issue preclusion, including bar and defense preclusion).
98. See HANDLEY, supra note 16, at 103-23; SPENCER BOWER & TURNER, supra note
18, at 149-57. To keep the discussion simple, I omit elaboration on English preclusion
extending to immediate privies, or to other persons in the case of an in rem judgment. See
HANDLEY, supranote 16, at 125-68.
99. See HANDLEY, supra note 16, at 106-12 (indicating an abiding English tendency to
preclude some admitted and unraised issues).
100. See BARNETT, supra note 91, at 23-24, 183-244 (discussing this new use of the
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terminology, England today has a fairly expansive doctrine, one that on
average reaches about as far as mid-twentieth-century American res
judicata.
B. Civil-Law Countries:Direct Estoppel
Drawing on the Roman tradition, 101 the civil-law countries in
Europe, 10 2 Latin America, 10 3 and Asia 10 4 take approaches that differ
from England's and that have worked out to provide a narrower res
judicata than England's. They rely on issue preclusion to enforce a
judgment's instantiation of truth. That preclusion prevents a second
decision from contradicting the first, and the reach of that preclusion
extends all the way to default judgments. This is not to suggest that the
civil law takes a uniform approach. Important differences exist between
France and Germany, for instance, with Germany's res judicata being
05
slightly narrower. 1

doctrine of abuse of process as a so-called extended doctrine of res judicata); HANDLEY,
supra note 16, at 305-21; ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE ch. 24 (3d ed. 2013); Garry D. Watson, Issue Estoppel, Abuse of
Process and Repetitive Litigation: The Death of Mutuality, in INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES ON CIVIL JUSTICE 179 (I.R. Scott ed., 1990). In addition, England has
recently added the somewhat shaky beginnings of a doctrine of jurisdiction to determine
(no) jurisdiction. See BARNETT, supra note 91, at 145-51.
101. See supra text accompanying note 16.
102. See CIVIL JUSTICE IN SPAIN 181-92 (Carlos Esplugues-Mota & Silvia Barona-Vilar
eds., 2009); FIELD ET AL., supra note 89, at 774-76 (France); PETER L. MURRAY & ROLF
STORNER, GERMAN CIVIL JUSTICE 355-65 (2004); Casad, supra note 28, at 67-68
(Sweden); Robert Wyness Millar, The Premises of the Judgment as Res Judicata in
Continental and Anglo-American Law (pt. 1), 39 MICH. L. REV. 1, 21-28 (1940) (Austria,
Denmark, Norway); Pelayia Yessiou-Faltsi, Greece, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA
OF LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE
237-243 (Piet Taelman ed., 2011); Zeuner & Koch, supra
note 27, §§ 9-78 to -79 (Italy). Compare K.D. Kerameus, Res Judicata"A Foreign Lawyer's
Impressions of Some Louisiana Problems, 35 LA. L. REV. 1151 (1975) (describing old
civilian approach), with 1 LA. CIV. L. TREATISE, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6:7 (2d ed. 2008)
(describing the state's shift in 1990 to common-law preclusion).
103. See ROBERT C. CASAD, CIVIL JUDGMENT RECOGNITION AND THE INTEGRATION OF
MULTIPLE-STATE ASSOCIATIONS 67-135 (1981); Casad, supranote 28, at 65-66, 68-70.
104. See TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN §
7.09[8] (Yasuhei Taniguchi et al. eds., rev. 2d ed. 2009); Kuo-Chang Huang, Res
Judicata-Its Subjective Scope, 38 TAIWAN JURIST 57 (2005) (article in Chinese);
Soonhyung Kwon, Comparison of Res Judicata in Korea and the U.S., 31 KOR. J. INT'L &
Comp. L. 67 (2003).
105. See Casad, supra note 28, at 65; Zeuner & Koch, supranote 27, §§ 9-61 to -77, -102
to -103 (discussing differing definitions of preliminary issues); infra text accompanying
notes 110 & 117. The German code, ZPO § 322(1), specifies: "Judgments are able to attain
legal force only insofar as they decide the demand raised by the complaint or
counterclaim." CHASE ET AL., supra note 80, at 447; see also infra text accompanying note
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To generalize, though, the bindingness of the court's specific
decisions on the parties' stated positions will normally work to prevent
the losing party from asserting new evidence or theories in order to
change the outcome and also to prevent the winning party from
relitigating in order to improve position, provided that the second suit
involves the same demand, ground, and parties. 10 6 In other words, the
civil law binds both parties to judicial determinations of the ultimate
107
issues, as opposed to preliminary issues involved in the reasoning;
but the determinations are usually binding only when they arise in the
same judicial context, that is, an assertion of the same subject matter
and not of a different claim. 108

319.
106. See FIELD ET AL., supra note 89, at 774-75 (explaining that the demand means
"the end the action has in view" or "generally the same juridical right sought as to the
same matter"; the ground or cause means "the ultimate facts and legal principle upon
which the action was grounded"; and the "same parties" includes privies but not the same
person who later sues in a different capacity). The French code, CODE CIVIL [C. cIv.]
[CIVIL CODE] art. 1351, specifies: 'The authority of res judicata extends only to what was
the subject matter of the judgment. The thing claimed must be the same; the action must
be based on the same ground; the action must be between the same parties, and brought
by and against them in the same capacities." FIELD ET AL., supra note 89, at 775.
107. See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 102, at 361 ("A judgment is binding not only
on the party which commenced the case, but also on the defendant. So, for instance, a
defendant who was adjudged liable to the plaintiff in a case for damages may not bring
his own action against the plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment of non-liability or any
limitation of liability directly inconsistent with the prior judgment.'); Zeuner & Koch,
supra note 27, § 9-102 (treating preliminary issues). An illustration of a preliminary issue
would assist:
For example, when a plaintiff brings a suit which seeks to obliterate the
registration of a defendant's land ownership, a court must first decide who has
the ownership of the land. Even though the court dismissed the action on the
grounds that the defendant has the ownership, the claim preclusion effect
applies to the inexistence of the plaintiffs right to demand the obliteration of
registration of the defendant's ownership, but does not apply to the judgment of
the defendant's ownership which was decided in the reason of the opinion.
Therefore, the plaintiff cannot again file the second action identical to the initial
action, but he can again file a second suit which seeks to confirm his ownership.
Kwon, supra note 104, at 70-71. But an ultimate finding can have an effect like ordinary
issue preclusion:
Meanwhile, if the judgment included in the order of an opinion is the
interlocutory problem in the second action, it naturally binds the court and
parties. . . . For example, when a plaintiff files suit for transfer of the object
after winning an ownership confirmation suit in which the ownership was
decided in the order of the opinion, the defendant cannot again dispute the
plaintiffs ownership in a second suit.
Id. 71.
108. See MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 102, at 357; cf. Zeuner & Koch, supra note 27,
§ 9-61 ("object of the lawsuit").
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This civil-law approach to preclusion is difficult to grasp for the
American legal mind. Americans would probably call it largely a type of
direct estoppel. It works to kill off the narrowly defined claim. Although
the exact definition of claim is heavily disputed and varies from country
to country, one can say by way of illustration that a plaintiff may
maintain separate suits for property and personal damages. 109
Thinking of civil-law preclusion in terms of the mandatory core
makes it much more comprehensible. By its direct estoppel, the civil
law delivers the minimal core of res judicata equivalent to bar and
defense preclusion. To avoid contradiction by a second judgment, the
civil law also delivers a narrow merger-like effect that keeps winning
plaintiffs from suing again on the same claim, although a few civil-law
countries allow claim-splitting of even their narrowly defined claims. 110
A legal system that relies heavily on documentary evidence and
does not heavily employ juries might have less need for preclusion."'
Such considerations do not affect the core, but rather they influence the
balance of policies that determines how much farther the country goes
in adopting res judicata rules. Certainly, the civil law provides neither
112
broad claim preclusion nor really any collateral estoppel.
However, any quick conclusions about the civil law's res judicata
narrowness should await consideration of its evidential use of prior
judgments, a use that is generally prohibited by the common law's
hearsay rule. 113 In order to affect other causes of action as well as other

109. See UGO A. MATTEI ET AL., SCHLESINGER'S COMPARATIVE LAW 818 (7th ed. 2009);
MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 102, at 357 (Germany); Zeuner & Koch, supra note 27, §
9-76 (France).
110. See MATTEI ET AL., supra note 109, at 818-19 (describing German law that allows
the plaintiff to sue for part of the damages and then sue for the rest, which is a desirable
course when costs and fees are tied to the amount demanded); MURRAY & STURNER, supra
note 102, at 357; Zeuner & Koch, supranote 27, §§ 9-61 to -62.
111. See J. MARK RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC
APPROACH 144-45 (1998) (attributing the narrowness of Japanese preclusion law to the
low cost of proving anew in a system that relies largely on documentary evidence and
operates without juries); Kwon, supra note 104, at 92 (mentioning also the prevalence of
pro se litigation in South Korea as discouraging preclusion law).
112. Compare von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 13, at 1676 ("It follows a fortiori
that the German system does not recognize any collateral estoppel effects whatsoever."),
with MURRAY & STORNER, supra note 102, at 358-59, 361 (discussing minor extensions).
On rudimentary jurisdiction to determine (no) jurisdiction, see Zeuner & Koch, supra note
27, §§ 9-58 to -59.
113. See Hiroshi Motomura, Using Judgments as Evidence, 70 MINN. L. REV. 979, 979
(1986). On the one hand, policy arguments exist against extending evidential weight to
factual findings: (1) combining a past decision with new evidence, especially new oral
evidence, is a bit like combining apples and oranges, (2) U.S. juries especially would have
trouble in weighing a past decision, and (3) the evidential approach lacks res judicata's
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persons, civil-law countries broadly allow this evidential use, weighing
the prior judgment along with the new evidence. 114 This practice also
reduces the need to expand preclusion law beyond the core. 115
The civil law nevertheless exhibits some signs of movement toward
broader res judicata. 116 For example, French courts might be moving
toward claim preclusion, knocking out unasserted arguments and
maybe even unasserted demands by, in effect, broadening their
definition of claim. 117 Meanwhile, Greece, for one example, has
introduced some notions of issue preclusion that would affect actions on
different claims. 118
Japan provides an interesting example, being patterned on
Germany but subject, after World War II, to considerable American
influence. 11 9 Taking a more straightforward path to a typically
restrained civil-law scope, Japanese res judicata law more overtly
expresses itself in terms of a claim-preclusive law that binds plaintiff
and defendant, but that is applicable only within the claim narrowly

advantage of altogether avoiding trial, an especially burdensome procedural stage in the
common-law systems. On the other hand, common-law systems do employ stare decisis.
Intended to give stability to the law and to improve judicial performance, this doctrine
provides that a court's holding on a legal question will normally be followed without
serious reconsideration, by the same court and any lower courts in the judicial hierarchy,
in future cases presenting indistinguishable facts. Contrasted with res judicata, stare
decisis (1) permits courts to handle precedent more flexibly, (2) applies only to issues of
law, as well as only to holdings and not to dicta, and (3) governs even in cases involving
wholly new parties on both sides. Id. at 1017-18.
114.
See FIELD ET AL., supra note 89, at 776; MArrEI ET AL., supranote 109, at 822-23;
cf. CARL F. GOODMAN, JUSTICE AND CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN 421 (2004) (describing
informal effects of prior judgment in bureaucratic Japanese judiciary).
115.
FIELD ETAL., supra note 89, at 776.
116. The emergence of a broader European Union res judicata law is another trend
worth noting. See BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & COMPARATIVE LAW, THE EFFECT IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS:
RECOGNITION, RES JUDICATA AND ABUSE OF PROCESS 5 (2009). Compare MURRAY &
STtRNER, supranote 102, at 365-66, with HANDLEY, supranote 16, at 328.
117. See LOIC CADIET & EMMANUEL JEULAND, DRoIr JUDICLIRE PRIVt 572-74 (8th ed.
2013). Compare FIELD ET AL., supra note 89, at 775-76, with PETER HERZOG & MARTHA
WESER, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN FRANCE 551-55 (Hans Smit ed., 1967) (giving older,
narrower view). While France reformed its law by judicial decision, Spain took similar
steps legislatively. See Robert C. Casad, Issue Preclusion in the Law of Spain: Cosa
Juzgada Positiva, in LAw AND JUSTICE IN A MULTISTATE WORLD 595 (James A.R. Nafziger
& Symeon C. Symeonides eds., 2002).
118. See Yessiou-Faltsi, supra note 102,
242. While Greece reformed its law
legislatively, Portugal took similar steps by judicial decision. See MATTEI ET AL., supra
note 109, at 820-21 (also mentioning other countries that could serve as examples); cf. id.
at 823 (mentioning civil-law use of declaratory actions).
119. See Takeshi Kojima, Japanese Civil Procedurein Comparative Law Perspective, 46
U. KAN. L. REV. 687, 693-96 (1998).
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defined as the same substantive right. 120 In some recent cases, the
Japanese courts seem to be introducing a very restricted doctrine of
12 1
collateral estoppel too.
C. Socialist Law and Other Models: Variation
Socialist law derives from the civil law, and tends not to differ
greatly from it at the "micro" level of procedure. 122 Russia delivers the
minimum of res judicata via claim preclusion, with claim defined by
grounds and by relief.123
Islamic legal systems seem to have a doctrine of claim preclusion,
even if it is little discussed. "In general, in Islamic law it is agreed upon,
that a judgment is binding and not able to be challenged. .. . This was
so obvious, that it was never greatly discussed in Islamic legal texts and
even in contemporary texts; it seems to be no need to discuss this

120. See MINJI SOSH1)H0 [MINSOHO] [C. CIv. PRO.] arts. 114-115 (Japan); HATTORI &
HENDERSON, supra note 104, § 7.09[8][c]. Traditionally the Japanese law "recognizes a
separate claim for each substantive right involved even though arising from a single
transaction," but perhaps the dimensions of the claim are seeing the beginnings of
expansion. Id. § 7.09[8][d].
121. See HATTORI & HENDERSON, supra note 104, § 7.09[8][b][i] (discussing the new use
of the principle of good faith as a kind of collateral estoppel); cf. Casad, supra note 28, at
66-67 (describing earlier Japanese moves in this direction). With a different history,
Taiwan is showing a similar trajectory from claim preclusion to a case-based law of
collateral estoppel. See Huang, supra note 104. It begins from Taiwan Code of Civil
Procedure art. 400, which provides: "Except as otherwise provided, res judicata exists as
to a claim adjudicated in a final judgment with binding effect." See also Kwon, supra note
104, at 67-68 ("The K[orean] CPL recognizes res judicata (claim preclusion), but in
principle does not recognize collateral estoppel (issue preclusion)."); cf. id. at 72-73, 75,
87-88, 90 (reporting academic support for collateral estoppel).
122. John Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 781,
800, 808 (1989) (stressing "the historical connection of socialist law to civil law and the
continuing relevance in socialist law of civil law rules, methods, institutions, and
procedures").
123. See Kirill Trofimov, Russian Federation (Russia), in 5 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE
322 (Piet Taelman ed., 2013) ('The legal
doctrine of res judicata precludes re-litigation of the same claim between the same parties
...[if] identical ...by grounds and by relief sought.'); Zeuner & Koch, supra note 27, §§
9-30, -39; cf. Viorel Mihai Ciobanu & Claudia Ana (Moarc5,) Costea, Romania, in 5
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE
225-226 (Piet Taelman
ed., 2013); Katalin Kelemen & BalAzs Fekete, How Should the Legal Systems of Eastern
Europe Be Classified Today?,
in
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR THE 10TH
ANNIVERSARY OF THE INSTITUTE OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 2014, at 197, 207 (A. Bad6 et al.
eds., 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2614944; Imre Szab6 & AdMl Koblos, Hungary, in 3
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE
238-240 (Piet Taelman
ed., 2014).
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issue." 124 Details of res judicata law beyond the core are so hard to come
by in English, however, that it would be foolish to attempt almost any
generalization about an Islamic approach.
Still, one can say that res judicata appears to be virtually universal.
Every justice system that has moved beyond its primitive beginnings,
becoming one that imposes nonconsensual judgments, has a rule that
the disgruntled cannot undo the judgment itself in most
circumstances. 125 This is the core of res judicata that is omnipresent.
Some countries may not recognize a doctrine translatable as res
judicata, but they will have this basic and intuitive rule. 126
True, Israeli rabbinical courts supposedly do without almost all of
res judicata law, 127 thus declining to follow Israel's approach based on
English res judicata.128 Those rabbinical courts exercise exclusive
jurisdiction over matters of marriage and divorce of Jews in Israel, as

Meyer-Reumann & Partners, Res Judicata in Sharjah Rent Law, LEX ARABIAE
2014),
http://lexarabiae.meyer-reumann.com/res-judicata-in-sharjah-rent-law/.
Compare AHMED AKGUNDYZ, INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW: ISLAMIC LAW IN THEORY
AND PRACTICE 29-30 (2010) (arguing that the West's concept of res judicata may have
Islamic origins), with H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 188 (5th ed.
2014) (arguing that Islamic res judicata is weakened by ample relief from judgment
obtainable in the judgment-rendering court). Of course, many Muslim countries have
mixed legal systems whose res judicata shows signs of the civil law, see, e.g., Abdellah
Boudahrain, Morocco, in 5 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: CIVIL PROCEDURE
518-520 (Piet Taelman ed., 1998), or the common law, see, e.g., Mirazul Hossain Khan,
Bangladesh, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAws: CIVIL PROCEDURE 253 (Piet
Taelman ed., 2006). See also Res Judicata and Code of Civil Procedure, LAWTEACHER,
http://www.
lawteacher.net/free-law-essays/constitutional-law/res-judicata-and-code-ofcivil-procedure -constitutional-law-essay.php (last visited Apr. 1, 2016) (describing res
judicata in India as "an all pervading concept present in all jurisdictions of the world" and
one "[u]nderstood in the distant past by both Hindu lawyers and Muslim jurists"); cf.
GLENN, supra, at 294 (treating Hindu law).
125. See BARNETr, supra note 91, at 24.
126. See, e.g.,
Meyer-Reumann, supranote 124; see also Yuval Sinai, Reconsidering Res
Judicata:A ComparativePerspective, 21 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 353, 387-88 (2011).
127. See GLENN, supra note 124, at 105 ("Put another way, the notion of res judicata
(chose jug6e, Rechtskraft) has little or no place in the thinking, and the truthful solution
is of greater value than decisional efficiency and stability."); Sinai, supra note 126, at
387-94 ("Rabbinical sources indicate that, if the court acquits the defendant in a suit and
the plaintiff lodges a claim against the defendant in another court, the defendant need not
litigate or answer the plaintiffs complaint in the second court; in addition, the second
court is not permitted to hear the plaintiff because the defendant has already been
acquitted by the first court. Thus, some RJ-like principles can be found in Jewish law, but
this role is minimal. In the Jewish legal system, a judgment is in principle subject to
revision, normally by the court that issued it.').
128. See STEPHAN GOLDSTEIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ISRAEL 138-43 (2d rev. ed.
2013); Casad, supra note 28, at 63 (grouping Israel); Eliahu Harnon, Res Judicataand
Identity of Actions Law and Rationale, 1 ISR. L. REV. 539, 541-42 (1966).
124.
(Apr.
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well as exercising some other jurisdiction. 129 They have eradicated res
judicata by expanding relief from judgment, giving the parties
significant ongoing power to attack validity in order to correct mere
factual and legal error. 130 "Consequently, an incorrect judgment is
absolutely null and void, and it may be said that the judge has not
finished his work until he gives a true judgment."' 131 Their explanation
is that they, without parallel among other advanced systems of law, put
the pursuit of truth above all other aims. 132 "Jewish law is religious law,
and as such the central idea guiding the judge is truth-based litigation,
an objective imposed on the judge as a religious obligation."' 133 All other
developed systems have found themselves obliged to adopt the more
realistic view that justice comprises more aims than just truth or
accuracy. Those other systems feel an undeniable institutional need to
have courts issue binding judgments. However, one way or another, the
rabbinical courts do not contradict my general rule. Perhaps the
rabbinical courts, although called courts, are operating as non-court
religious
institutions
dispensing
gemeinschaft-type
disputeresolution. 134 An alternative view would be that absence of res judicata
has proven either insignificant or untenable for the rabbinical courts.
Worth noting are both the parties' infrequent use of that power to
reopen judgments and the rabbinical authorities' recent efforts to hem
in the power to reopen. 135 Also important to note is that the venue for
relief is the judgment-rendering court itself, which can thereby try to
136
patrol the degree to which its judgments are undercut.
Less developed legal systems might dispense even more completely
with any conscious notion of res judicata. Navajo courts are said not to
have much sense of res judicata. 137 These systems might be exceptions
that prove the rule, but really they do not fall within the rule. To see
this, consider the interesting illustration of pre-1959 Tibetan law, which
was medieval and Buddhist in nature:

129. Sinai, supranote 126, at 387-88.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 396.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 395.
134. See Michelle Greenberg-Kobrin, Religious Tribunals and Secular Courts:
Navigating Power and Powerlessness,41 PEPP. L. REV. 997, 1008 (2014).
135. See Sinai, supra note 126, at 387-88.
136. See id. at 389-93.
137. See Dale Beck Furnish, The Navajo Nation: A Three-Ingredient Mix, 12 ELEC. J.
COMP. L., May 2008, no. 1, art. 8, at 22, http://www.ejcl.org/121/artl2l-8.pdf (discussing
"an important aspect of Navajo law's consensual nature').
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Cases could be reopened right after they were decided, even
when the parties had both agreed to the judge or conciliator's
decision. Tibetans considered this one of the best aspects of
their system: they were free to disagree until they felt that the
dispute had been correctly decided. Judicial decisions had no
finality in the way we understand finality; calming the mind
and reaching real harmony were necessary before a dispute
could actually be over. In Buddhism, this continuing freedom to
disagree is part of the infinite potential of the mind to change
138
and choose.
A Tibetan court could not impose its decision unless the parties agreed,
and a party could withdraw its agreement at any time and reopen the
case even in another court.139 Perhaps the approach was instrumental:
Tibetans realize that if courts make final decisions in civil cases,
the parties to the dispute, mainly neighbors, may not reconcile
to the point that they could work together . . . . Absence of res
judicata forces the parties to come to a mutually agreeable
conclusion. 140
IV. UNITED STATES: THE EXAMPLE OF BROAD EXTENT

My comparative tour of the world could suggest a spectrum of res
judicata extending from the aboriginal and rabbinical courts up to
Germany and then France from the civil law, next to England and
finally to the expansive U.S. law. But closer examination shows only the
English-law-derived countries adopting res judicata much greater than
the minimal core, with all other countries concentrated around the core.
I shall therefore take the United States and China as the prime, albeit
extreme, examples of the two camps.
Zooming in on the United States, one sees that the mix of policies
has prompted its distinctive res judicata to become a good deal more

138. REBECCA REDWOOD FRENCH, THE GOLDEN YOKE: THE LEGAL COSMOLOGY OF
BUDDHIST TIBET 9, 126, 137-40, 344-45 (1995); see also Tenzin Namgyal, History of
PM),
2013
8:27
18,
TIBETAN POL. REV. (Dec.
Tibetan Legal System,
review/articles/historyoftibetanlegalsystem
https://sites.google.comlsite/tibetanpolitical
("The finality of the case reached when both the parties agreed with each other on fact not
with the reality.... Thus if both the parties agreed the sky was red, the factual consensus
had been achieved.').
139. Namgyal, supra note 138.
140. Daniel P. Strouthes, Aboriginal and Indigenous Peoples, Legal Systems of, 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW & SOCIETY 1, 2 (David S. Clark ed., 2007).
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expansive than res judicata law in all other countries. 4 1 Hence, res
judicata is more prominent here and, accordingly, more hotly debated
on the ground of policy. Although it is clear that the triumph of finality
by virtue of res judicata is not unconstitutional, some analysts believe
that the U.S. law has gone too far as a matter of policy. The most
obvious candidate for criticism is the radical expansion of nonmutual
issue preclusion, which allows strangers to benefit from the binding
1 42
effect of a prior judgment to which they were neither party nor privy.
But a general description of the American law must precede that
criticism.
The leading work of comparative law on res judicata tries, in a
rather formalistic way, to identify some characteristics by which to
measure national variations. In addition, of course, to the binding
effects on claims, issues, and persons, these characteristics include (1)
when a decision becomes final enough to generate preclusion,1 43 (2)
whether a judge will raise res judicata or the parties must, 144 and (3)
whether the doctrine is inapplicable to certain procedural or
preliminary issues. 145 So, to begin consideration of American res
judicata law, I shall tick off these three incidental characteristics before
summarizing the extent of the doctrine.
First, a judgment must be a final judgment to have res judicata
effects. 146 In the United States, the rendering court must have uttered
its last word on the decided claim or issue to qualify the ruling as
final. 147 The law does not want to preclude on the basis of the tentative,
contingent, or provisional. 48 The effective date of the judgment is its
date of rendition, having nothing to do with the date of the action's

141. The best commentaries on this modern law of res judicata lie in particular
volumes of the two wonderful multivolume works on civil procedure, namely, 18 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE (2d ed. 2002), which is simply brilliant in many instances, and 18 SUSAN
BANDES & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE (3d ed. 1999). For shorter
overviews, see CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 1, and SHAPIRO, supra note 8. The
following summary is drawn largely from CASAD & CLERMONT, supra note 1; CLERMONT,
supra note 5, ch.5; and of course the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS (AM. LAW
INST. 1982), all of which provide much fuller citations.
142. See 18A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 4464.1.
143. See Zeuner & Koch, supranote 27, §§ 9-7, -49.
144. See id. § 9-47.
145. See id. § 9-59 (procedural decisions, which are usually binding); id. § 9-102
(preliminary issues, which are not binding in the civil law).
146. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 13 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
147. Id. §§ 13-14.
148. See id. § 13 cmt. b, § 14 cmt. a.
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commencement. 149 Fearing the effects of undue delay, U.S. law provides
that the status of final does not await expiration of the time to seek
review by motion or appeal, and remains unaffected by the actual
pursuit of review. 150 The judgment is final upon its rendering, and it
stays final unless and until it is actually overturned. 151 Nevertheless, a
final judgment has a meaning slightly variable as between claim
preclusion and issue preclusion.
For the purposes of claim preclusion, a judgment becomes final
when the trial court has concluded all regular proceedings on the claim
other than award of costs and enforcement of judgment.152 A judgment
153
is final even though a motion for new trial or an appeal is pending.
But a determination of liability is not final if the trial court still has to
determine damages, or if some other issue of law or fact involved in the
merits stays open.154
For issue preclusion, some courts treat an adjudication as a final
judgment at an earlier stage. According to some recent authorities, the
court in the second action has discretion cautiously to treat a prior
determination as final if the initial court made a firm decision on the
issue after adequate hearing and full deliberation, even though in that
initial action there is as of yet no final judgment on the whole claim. 155
But this fuzzy extension of issue preclusion in pursuit of rather small
benefits can cause some major complications when later decisions come
in the initial action, and so the better view is that the prerequisite for
issue preclusion should return to the same strict standard of finality
that applies for claim preclusion. 156
Second, U.S. res judicata law is not self-executing. 157 The person
wishing to rely on it must raise it or suffer waiver. 158 This result flows
from the premises of the adversary system, coupled with the fact that
most policies underlying res judicata are not so critical as to require

149. Id. § 14.
150. See id. § 14 & cmt. a.
151. Id. § 13 cmt. f.
152. Id. § 13 cmt. b.
153. Id. § 16.
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Insured Lloyd's, 786 F.2d 1265, 1269-71
(5th Cir. 1986) (refusing to give preclusive effect to a partial summary judgment that was
nonappealable).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 412-13 (2000) ("[T]rial courts must
be cautious about raising a preclusion bar sua sponte, thereby eroding the principle of
party presentation so basic to our system of adjudication."); Carbonell v. La. Dep't of
Health & Human Res., 772 F.2d 185, 189 (5th Cir. 1985).
158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c); Arizona, 530 U.S. at 409-10.
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judicial invocation and none of the policies require invocation in every
single case. Nonetheless, the court has the power to raise res judicata
on its own, although it does so only when its own interests are
endangered and, even then, does so rarely. 159
Third, U.S. law does not exclude certain kinds of issues from the
reach of res judicata. 160 Indeed, the expansive U.S. law does not draw
many of the distinctions that bedevil civil-law res judicata. 161 Moreover,
U.S. courts need not struggle with fitting res judicata into commands
from on high. On the one hand, American res judicata is an almost
entirely judge-made body of law. Each jurisdiction's courts have
responded to the needs they most acutely felt by formulating, revising,
and complexifying the doctrine. Thus, the states and the federal
government have their own doctrine of res judicata applicable to their
own judgments. On the other hand, it is true that constitutions,
legislation, and rulemaking could override the judicial doctrine. The
U.S. Constitution has a potential, albeit limited, impact on res judicata
doctrine; in many jurisdictions, statutes deal with small parts of the
subject; most court rules avoid most of the subject. The belief is that in
general, res judicata is just too complex a subject for successful
codification.
A. Claim Preclusion
Outside the context of the initial action, a party (or privy) generally
may not relitigate a claim decided therein by a valid and final
judgment, whether that judgment came about through litigation,
default, dismissal, or consent.162 The judgment extinguishes the whole
claim, precluding all matters within the claim that were or could have
63
been litigated in that initial action.1

159. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 231 (1995) ('What may
follow from our holding that the judicial power unalterably includes the power to render
final judgments is not that waivers of res judicata are always impermissible, but rather
that, as many Federal Courts of Appeals have held, waivers of res judicata need not
always be accepted-that trial courts may in appropriate cases raise the res judicata bar
on their own motion."); Disimone v. Browner, 121 F.3d 1262, 1267 (9th Cir. 1997).
160. See Plaut, 514 U.S. at 231.
161. See Zeuner & Koch, supra note 27, § 9-2 (res judicata versus constitutive effects);
id. § 9-8 (formal and material res judicata); id. § 9-28 (substantive and procedural
theories of res judicata).
162.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).

163.

Id.
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Bar and Merger Rule

Claim preclusion subdivides into bar and merger. 164 If the judgment
in the initial action was in the defendant's favor, the plaintiffs claim is
said to be barred by the judgment. 165 If the judgment in the initial
action was in the plaintiffs favor, the plaintiffs claim is said to merge
in the judgment.166 In brief, bar and merger prohibit repetitive
litigation of the same claim once adjudged. 167 Besides the prerequisites
of a valid and final judgment, the only requirement is identity of
69
claim. 168 This requirement necessitates definition of a "claim."1
The old view, to which some American jurisdictions still adhere,
defined claim narrowly, but foggily, in terms of a single legal theory or a
single substantive right or remedy of the plaintiff. 170 Indeed, the courts
used the term "cause of action" rather than claim. 171 This analytical
definition is similar to the narrow definitions still prevailing in the rest
172
of the world.
America's new "transactional" view is that a claim includes all
rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant on any theory
with respect to the transaction from which the action arose. 173 Whether
particular facts constitute a single "transaction" is a pragmatic
question, turning on the efficiency-fairness rationale of res judicata and
therefore on such factors "as whether the facts are related in time,
space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit,
and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties'
expectations or business understanding or usage."'174 Still, a claim will
be big enough to include: (1) different harms; (2) different evidence; (3)
different legal theories, whether cumulative, alternative, or even
inconsistent; (4) different rights and remedies, whether legal or
equitable; and (5) a series of related events. 175 So, if P sues D for

164. See id. §§ 18-19.
165. Id. § 19.
166, Id. § 18(1).
167. Id. §§ 18-19.
168. Id. § 24.
169. Id.
170. Id. § 24 cmt. a.
171. See id.
172. See, e.g., FIELD ETAL., supra note 89, at 775 (France).
173. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
174. Id. § 24(2). Even under the transactional view, however, the typical claim involves
only a single plaintiff and a single defendant. That is, multiple parties on either side
typically mean multiple claims.
175. Id. § 24.
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personal injury resulting from an automobile accident and later, after
valid and final judgment, P sues D for property damage in the same
accident, D can successfully plead claim preclusion under the
176
transactional view.
The transactional view rests on the idea that the plaintiff should in
a single lawsuit fully litigate his or her grievances arising from a
transaction, considering that under the modern and permissive rules of
procedure the plaintiff may do S0.177 This requirement increases
efficiency, with an acceptable burden on fairness. Accordingly, the
plaintiff must be careful to put any asserted claim entirely before the
court, because judgment will not only preclude actual relitigation, but
also preclude later pursuit of the claim's unasserted portion, that is, the
part that could have been, but was not, litigated.1 78 Any plaintiff who
asserts only a part of the claim is said to have impermissibly split the
claim. 179
Although in its early years the transactional approach was
vigorously criticized as being too vague and leaving too much to the
whim of the judge, in recent times it has come to be recognized that
much of the certainty of application supposedly exhibited by the older
approach was illusory. Judges can and will find ways to avoid the rigors
of any test when the interests of justice seem to require it. The
transactional test has the advantage of recognizing this fact of legal life
and of focusing the inquiry upon factors that are really relevant to the
administration of justice, rather than masking them under some largely
artificial analytical construct.1 8 0 The transactional test better realizes
the sum of efficiency and fairness policies. Also, it clearly is more
consonant with present-day legal reasoning in the United States than
the older tests, as shown by the prevalence of transactional approaches
in other contexts such as jurisdiction, joinder, and amendments.
Consequently, the trend of decisions is toward ever wider acceptance of
it.
2.

Defense Preclusion Rule

Once the plaintiff prevails on a claim, the defendant cannot forward
new (or old) defenses to defend it anew. 8 1 So, if the plaintiff were to

176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. § 24 cmt. c, illus. 1.
Id. § 24(1) & cmt. a.
Id. § 24.
Id. § 24 cmt. h.

180. See id. § 24(2).
181. See id. § 18(2).
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seek to enforce the judgment, as by an action upon the judgment, the
defendant could not then raise defenses that were or could have been
interposed in that initial action. 182 The formal reasoning is that the
plaintiff is now suing on the judgment, not on the merged claim, so the
defendant's defenses to the claim are immaterial.1833 The deeper reason
is that if a judgment is to have meaning, both the plaintiff and the
defendant must forward their grounds and arguments before rendition,
not after. That much seems intuitively obvious.
The defendant would lose all use of defenses after rendition of
judgment.184 Because the system must thus prevent the defendant from
taking the offense against the judgment, defense preclusion says that
5
the defendant cannot bring an action to "unravel" the judgment. 18 This
so-called common-law compulsory counterclaim rule emerges from the
just-described intuitive principle of claim preclusion that a valid and
final judgment generally precludes the defendant from later asserting
mere defenses to the claim.1 86 The implicit extension is that once a
plaintiff obtains a judgment, the defendant generally cannot bring a
new action to undo the judgment by reopening the plaintiffs claim and
pushing those defenses offensively. 187 The extension's evident rationale
is that defense preclusion simply must apply when the effect of the
defendant's collaterally asserted defense would be to undo the earlier
judgment for the plaintiff, 88 because otherwise judgments would not be
worth much.
This barrier to offensive collateral attack may seem to occupy some
arcane corner of the specialty of res judicata. But the common-law
compulsory counterclaim rule in fact is critical to any justice system.
That is, although it is intuitive, it is also very important. Note first that

182. Id.
183. Id. § 18 cmt. a.
184. Id. § 18(2).
185. Under U.S. law, this rule against defending offensively has a long lineage,
although it was originally accomplished through issue preclusion rather than claim
preclusion. See 2 FREEMAN, supra note 1, § 774, at 1646-50 (discussing the rules of
"defense" preclusion); cf. 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 4414 (discussing the rules of
"defendant" preclusion). Now, the U.S. law calls it the common-law compulsory
counterclaim rule. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2)(b) & reporter's note
f (AM. LAW INST. 1982); Kevin M. Clermont, Common-Law Compulsory Counterclaim
Rule: CreatingEffective and Elegant Res JudicataDoctrine, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1745,
1752 (2004).
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2)(b) (AM. LAW INST. 1982);
Clermont, supra note 185, at 1752-53.
187.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).

188.

See id. § 22(2)(b).
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the rule applies whether or not the prior judgment was by default. 159
This application indeed is especially important because the rule works
to guarantee that default judgments mean something and cannot
normally be undone by later litigation. Note also that the rule applies
whether or not a compulsory counterclaim statute or court rule appears
on the books and applies in the circumstances. 190 That fact explains
why the rule's very name declares it to be a common-law, or judgemade, doctrine.
Failure to assert an available counterclaim will preclude bringing a
subsequent action thereon if granting relief would "nullify" the
judgment in the initial action.191 To illustrate, the common-law
compulsory counterclaim rule therefore (1) precludes a defendant
seeking to impair the plaintiffs property interest declared by the initial
judgment, (2) precludes a defendant seeking restitution for money paid
pursuant to the initial judgment, and a fortiori (3) prohibits injunctive
19 2
or declaratory relief against enforcement of the initial judgment.
Thus, an uncontested judgment quieting title to real estate in the
plaintiff precludes a later action by the defendant to claim title based on
facts existing at the time of the earlier judgment. 193 Also, if P sues D for
contract damages, wins, and executes on the valid and final judgment,
and if D later sues to rescind the contract for mutual mistake and
obtain restitution of the amount recovered, D will run into defense
preclusion. 194 Finally, the defendant is precluded from bringing an
action for a declaratory judgment of nonliability after the plaintiff has
obtained a favorable judgment on the same transaction.
But note that the narrow principle behind the common-law
compulsory counterclaim rule applies only where the relief sought in
the second action would inherently undo the first judgment. 195 Thus, in
the absence of a compulsory counterclaim statute or rule of court, D
may default in Ps personal injury action and then bring a separate
action against P for D's injuries sustained in the same accident, the idea
being that a judgment in favor of D for D's injuries would not nullify Ps
prior judgment for Ps injuries. 196 D's recovery might be logically and
practically incompatible, but it does not undo the prior judgment.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Id. § 22 cmt. f
Id.
Id. § 22(2)(b).
Id. § 22 cmt. f.
Id. § 22 cmt. f, illus. 10.
Id. § 22 cmt. f, illus. 9.
See id. § 22(2)(b).
Id. § 22 cmt. b & illus. 1.
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So also, although the defendant purchaser of medical services
should be precluded from suing for restitution after the plaintiff seller
obtained and executed on a default judgment for the contract price, an
action by the defendant seeking damages for medical malpractice (as
opposed to return of the contract price paid pursuant to the default
judgment) should not be precluded in the absence of a compulsory
counterclaim statute or rule of court. 197 These examples clarify that the
defendant loses only the ability to defend anew the first action, not the
ability to seek relief arising from the transaction in question.
Those last few explanatory paragraphs expose that the scope of the
common-law compulsory counterclaim rule is tricky. The rule applies to
prevent a second action only if it seeks to nullify the first. 198 Centrally,
what does nullify mean precisely? The word has an unavoidable
fuzziness that will trouble courts, while both leaving defendants in
doubt about their exposure during the initial action and also providing
them room for maneuver in structuring their claims for relief in the
second action. Nevertheless, the fuzziness does not deserve
exaggeration. Taking a wide view of the rule's purposes and of its
genesis helps in determining its proper scope. Recall that it emerged as
a specific means to effectuate the principle that a valid and final
judgment generally precludes the defendant from later asserting mere
defenses to the claim. 199 Therefore, the defendant cannot later pursue
an action that is essentially a way to defend anew against an already
200
adjudicated claim.
In addition, of course, a compulsory counterclaim statute or court
rule might effectively provide that, under certain circumstances, failure
to assert an available counterclaim precludes bringing a subsequent
action thereon. 201 But adopting such a provision is a matter of policy,
not necessity.

197. Id. § 22 cmt. b, illus. 2.
198. Id. § 22(2)(b).
199. See id.; Clermont, supranote 185, at 1752-53.
200. In the future, there could be pressure to expand the common-law compulsory
counterclaim doctrine. See 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 4414 (arguing for
preclusion of omitted defenses in successive actions by plaintiff against defendant on
separate but related claims); cf. FIELD ET AL., supra note 89, at 711, 714-15, 726
(recounting pressure to expand the dimensions of an issue and to loosen the requirements
for issue preclusion). Other pressure points for expanding res judicata-by watering down
the requirement of a final judgment, limiting the availability of relief from judgment,
expanding the dimensions of a claim, limiting the reach of preclusion exceptions, and
extending benefits to strangers--are a theme in the above text on the U.S. law.
201. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
22(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. 1982); CLERMONT, supra note 5, at 459-62.
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Exceptions to Claim Preclusion

Predictably, this broad conception of claim preclusion has generated
a few exceptions. As a result, the claimant sometimes is permitted to
bring a second action on part, or all, of the same claim. There is,
however, no general exception based on the interests of justice or the
like. The best way to convey this case law is to turn to the Second
Restatement:
When any of the following circumstances exists, the general rule
of [bar or merger] does not apply to extinguish the claim, and
part or all of the claim subsists as a possible basis for a second
action by the plaintiff against the defendant:
(a) The parties have agreed in terms or in effect that the
plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant has
acquiesced therein; or
(b) The court in the first action has expressly reserved
the plaintiffs right to maintain the second action; or
(c) The plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of
the case or to seek a certain remedy or form of relief in
the first action because of the limitations on the subject
matter jurisdiction of the courts or restrictions on their
authority to entertain multiple theories or demands for
multiple remedies or forms of relief in a single action,
and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on
that theory or to seek that remedy or form of relief; or
(d) The judgment in the first action was plainly
inconsistent with the fair and equitable implementation
of a statutory or constitutional scheme, or it is the sense
of the scheme that the plaintiff should be permitted to
split his claim; or
(e) For reasons of substantive policy in a case involving
a continuing or recurrent wrong, the plaintiff is given an
option to sue once for the total harm, both past and
prospective, or to sue from time to time for the damages
incurred to the date of suit, and chooses the latter
course; or
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(f) It is clearly and convincingly shown that the policies
favoring preclusion of a second action are overcome for
an extraordinary reason, such as the apparent invalidity
of a continuing restraint or condition having a vital
relation to personal liberty or the failure of the prior
litigation to yield a coherent disposition of the
202
controversy.
Additionally, a judgment against the claimant may be given for
various reasons that have nothing to do with the substantive validity of
the claim. 20 3 For example, a claim may be dismissed for certain
procedural defects in the form or manner of its presentation. A claimant
should not be penalized to the extent of losing all right to a day in court
on the substantive merits of the claim just because of such a technical
defect. The Second Restatement captures this idea in a separate
exception to bar, one that notably has been shrinking over time:
(1) A personal judgment for the defendant, although valid and
final, does not bar another action by the plaintiff on the same
claim:
(a) When the judgment is one of dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for nonjoinder or
misjoinder of parties; or
(b) When the plaintiff agrees to or elects a nonsuit (or
voluntary dismissal) without prejudice or the court
directs that the plaintiff be nonsuited (or that the action
be otherwise dismissed) without prejudice; or
(c) When by statute or rule of court the judgment does
not operate as a bar to another action on the same
claim, or does not so operate unless the court specifies,
and no such specification is made.
(2) A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which
rests on the prematurity of the action or on the plaintiffs failure
to satisfy a precondition to suit, does not bar another action by
the plaintiff instituted after the claim has matured, or the

202.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 26(1)(a)-(f) (AM. LAW INST. 1982).

203. Id. § 20.

1114

RUTGERS UNIVERSITYLAWREVIEW[Vol. 68:1067

precondition has been satisfied, unless a second action is
20 4
precluded by operation of the substantive law.

B. Issue Preclusion
Claim preclusion aims at limiting the number of lawsuits that may
be brought with respect to the same controversy. 20 5 If claim preclusion
applies, a second lawsuit on the same claim will wholly terminate,
regardless of what issues were or were not litigated in the first
lawsuit. 20 6 By contrast, U.S. issue preclusion concerns only repeated
litigation of the same issues. 20 7 Thus, issue preclusion would apply only
if claim preclusion were inapplicable, either because an exception to
claim preclusion applied or because a different claim was in suit.
While the core of claim preclusion is necessary, issue preclusion in
the United States is not a necessary doctrine, but rather the product of
policy determinations in favor of finality. Here, issue preclusion need
not do the work of claim preclusion, which already is in place. Instead,
it can act as a supplemental doctrine that blocks relitigation of issues,
even on a different claim and perhaps even for the benefit of persons
neither parties nor privies.
1. Issue Preclusion Rule
Outside the context of the initial action, a party (or privy) generally
may not relitigate the same issue of fact or of law (or the same mixed
issue of law and fact) that was actually litigated and determined
therein if the determination was essential to a valid and final
judgment. 20 8 Indeed, U.S. issue preclusion applies in a second action
brought on the same claim (direct estoppel) or on a different claim
(collateral estoppel).209

This doctrine of issue preclusion rests on the premise that one court
should be as capable as any other to resolve the issues in dispute. Once
a judgment resolves the issues, after the adversary system of
adjudication has run its full and fair course, the issues should not again
be open to dispute by the same parties in any court. 2 10 Issue preclusion
204.
205.
206.

Id. § 20(1)-(2).
FIELD ET AL., supra note 89, at 668
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18-19 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).

207.

See id. § 27.

208.

Id.

209. Id. § 27 cmt. b.
210. See id. § 27 & cmt. a.
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not only accords with the dictates of fairness but also serves the
interests of economy of judicial effort, fosters the certainty and stability
of repose, and tends to prevent the anomalous situation, damaging to
public faith in the judicial system, of two authoritative, but conflicting
answers, being given to the very same question. Nevertheless, an overly
aggressive doctrine of issue preclusion would be unfair to a person who
had good reason to limit the scope of the prior litigation, and it would
instigate overlitigation of that prior litigation in anticipation of possible
211
preclusion.
In brief, when claim preclusion does not apply, issue preclusion acts
to prevent inappropriate relitigation of essential issues. That is, issue
preclusion reaches only the same issues that were actually litigated and
determined, not those that were defaulted, admitted, stipulated, or
consented; and issue preclusion reaches only essential determinations,
not dicta or other asides. 212 This doctrinal statement implies three
requirements for application of issue preclusion: (1) same issue, (2)
213
actually litigated and determined, and (3) essential to judgment.
First, prohibiting relitigation of the same issue critically requires
definition of an "issue." The modern, or so-called functional, view is that
the scope of an issue should be determined in light of the efficiencyfairness rationale of res judicata. Whether a matter to be presented in a
subsequent action constitutes the same issue as a matter presented in
the initial action is a pragmatic question, turning on such factors as the
degree of overlap between the factual evidence and legal argument
advanced with respect to the matter in the initial action and that to be
21 4
advanced with respect to the matter in the subsequent action.
Consider two contrasting illustrations. In a litigated tort action that
an allegedly speeding defendant won because of the plaintiffs failure to
prove negligence, an issue would be the broad matter of the defendant's
negligence, thus precluding in a subsequent action between the parties
the former plaintiffs assertion of a different manner in which the
former defendant was negligent in that incident, such as by
drunkenness. 215 It was efficient and fair to require the plaintiff to air all
negligence grounds in the first action, because of the heavy overlap of
factual evidence and legal argument between grounds of negligence.
However, in an installment contract action that a plaintiff won, where
the sole litigated and determined issue was the narrow defensive
211.
212.

See id. § 27 cmt. e.
Id. § 27 & cmts. e, h.

213. See id. § 27.
214.
215.

Id. § 27 cmt. c.
Id. § 27 cmt. c, illus. 4.
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matter of the contract's illegality, the judgment would leave open the
defense of the contract's nonexecution as a different issue in a
subsequent action for a later installment. 216 In view of the differing
factual evidence and legal argument for the two defenses, it was not
efficient and fair to require the defendant to air both defenses in the
first action.
Fixing the dimensions of an issue, then, is critical to the reach of
issue preclusion. Broad or narrow dimensions mean either a widely
applicable doctrine, which starts to overlap with claim preclusion as it
reaches matters not really contested, or a much less significant
doctrine, which would extend only to absolutely indistinguishable
matters. The difficulty is that it is always logically possible to state an
issue in a variety of ways, in ascending levels of generality. American
courts do not fix the issue in the narrowest terms possible, nor do they
resort to the broadest terms possible. Instead, courts fix the issue in the
middle in accordance with the particularistic dictates of efficiency and
fairness, but guided primarily by what the parties actually contested,
unless the first action's question is evidentially and legally as much a
unity as negligence is.
Note finally that if a different legal standard applies in the second
action, or if the facts have changed, then the issue is different, so
preventing issue preclusion. Changed circumstances change the issue.
If the invoker of issue preclusion makes a prima facie showing in
support of the issue preclusion rule but the invokee challenges the
identity of issues, the invoker must show that the two cases involve the
same issue.
Second, for preclusive effect, the issue must have been "actually
litigated and determined. ' 217 The meaning here is that the potentially
bound parties must have submitted the issue for determination (by the
pleadings or otherwise) and that their adjudicator must have decided
the issue (whether by careful weighing of evidence and arguments or by
mechanical application of some rule like the burden of proof). 218 Thus,
issue preclusion can result after full-blown trial or from a motion
decided on papers, but it does not result from admission or stipulation
or from a default or consent judgment. 219 The idea is that a rule of issue
preclusion without the actually-litigated-and-determined requirement
would unnecessarily and undesirably intensify litigation by encouraging

216.

Id. § 27 cmt. a, illus. 2.

217. Id. § 27.
218. See id. § 27 cmt. d.
219.

Id. § 27 cmts. d, e.
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parties to raise and fight every conceivable issue, without sufficient
offsetting benefits.
Some cases have departed from this requirement in order to apply
issue preclusion to default judgments. 220 The theory of these cases is
that the truth of all the facts alleged by the plaintiff and necessary to
the recovery are raised by the plaintiffs pleading, and the defendant
should not be able to escape the effect of judgment by waiving the right
to contest them. 221 Others have treated consent judgments similarly, in
spite of the usual rule. 222 However, these cases' approach is not only
unfair and inefficient, but also fictional in treating as established many
matters that were never decided. Although a default or consent
judgment can have claim preclusion effect, it should not generate issue
preclusion.
Third, under the majority view, issue preclusion applies only to a
determination that was "essential to judgment." 223 Thus, a
determination not strictly necessary to reaching the court's ultimate
result is not binding. 224 Some submitted issues actually determined
may have no bearing on the ultimate outcome of the case, and some
issues may be decided against the party who ultimately wins the
judgment, but such determinations, even though the apparent products
of actual and vigorous litigation, do not have issue-preclusive effect. The
idea behind this requirement is that a nonessential determination is in
the nature of dicta and so may not really have been fully and fairly
contested and considered, and also appeal on it may have been
unavailable or the winning party may have been unmotivated to
appeal. 225 Moreover, society wants neither to stimulate the parties to
fight further over such asides nor to encourage courts so to make
unnecessary pronouncements. Accordingly, decisions that led toward
the judgment are essential, but not those that standing alone would
have led toward the opposite outcome.
For example, in a state following the common law's contributorynegligence rule, if the court specifically found in an accident case both
that the plaintiff had been contributorily negligent and that the
defendant had been negligent, the determination of the latter issue
would have no issue-preclusive effect, because it was not essential to
the judgment rendered for the defendant. That is, the contributorily

220.

See, e.g., Lynch v. Lynch, 94 N.W.2d 105, 109 (Iowa 1959).

221.

See, e.g., id.

222.
223.

See, e.g., Township of Washington v. Gould, 189 A.2d 697, 700-01 (N.J. 1963).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).

224. Id. § 27 & cmt. h.
225.

Id.
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negligent plaintiff would have lost the case, whether or not the
defendant had been negligent. Therefore, the court's finding on the
defendant's negligence should just vaporize. Note, in particular, that no
argument that the finding of the defendant's negligence was factually,
legally, or logically primary or prior to the finding of the plaintiffs
contributory negligence would succeed in overcoming the result of
nonpreclusion.
2.

Exceptions to Issue Preclusion

Courts apply issue preclusion quite flexibly, invoking several
exceptions, albeit of narrow scope. Efficiency concerns might counsel
exceptions, especially the policy against encouraging parties to
overlitigate the initial action by fighting every conceivable issue to the
death. 226 Fairness concerns also might suggest exceptions, as where
there was no full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue. 227 Finally,
independent substantive policies might overwhelm the policies behind
applying res judicata. To sum up, the Second Restatement provides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a
valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to
the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action
between the parties is not precluded in the following
circumstances:
(1) The party against whom preclusion is sought could
not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the
judgment in the initial action; or
(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions
involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a
new determination is warranted in order to take
account of an intervening change in the applicable legal
context or otherwise to avoid inequitable administration
of the laws; or
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by
differences in the quality or extensiveness of the
procedures followed in the two courts or by factors

226. See id. § 27 cmt. e.
227. See id. § 28(5).
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relating to the allocation of jurisdiction between them;
or
(4) The party against whom preclusion is sought had a
significantly heavier burden of persuasion with respect
to the issue in the initial action than in the subsequent
action; the burden has shifted to his adversary; or the
adversary has a significantly heavier burden than he
had in the first action; or
(5) There is a clear and convincing need for a new
determination of the issue (a) because of the potential
adverse impact of the determination on the public
interest or the interests of persons not themselves
parties in the initial action, (b) because it was not
sufficiently foreseeable at the time of the initial action
that the issue would arise in the context of a subsequent
action, or (c) because the party sought to be precluded,
as a result of the conduct of his adversary or other
special circumstances, did not have an adequate
opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair
228
adjudication in the initial action.
3.

Extensions to Issue Preclusion

229
A judgment does not bind a person who is neither party nor privy.
230
That person is called a stranger to the judgment. Good policy entitles
a stranger to a day in court before a judgment has any legally binding
effect on that person. However, the stranger could conceivably benefit
from the judgment. The most important form of potential benefit is a
stranger's using of the prior judgment for collateral estoppel against a
231
former party or privy.
The old doctrine of mutuality of estoppel held that a person may not
benefit from a prior judgment if he or she would not have been bound by
any outcome of that initial action. 232 Because strangers were never

228. Id. § 28.
229. Id. § 27 & cmt. a.
230. FIELD ETAL., supra note 89, at 740.
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982); cf. 18A
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 141, § 4464.1 (treating nonmutual claim preclusion for
secondary-liability situations).
232. See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 93 (AM. LAW INST. 1942).
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bound, they could therefore never benefit. 233 Unless both persons
arguing about res judicata could have been bound, neither was bound
235
as to the other. 234 Thus, a judgment's estoppels were mutual.
Under the mutuality doctrine there came to exist, however,
substantial extensions of res judicata that allowed strangers to benefit
in some compelling circumstances. The most important extension
concerned a person whose liability was secondary, allowing that person
to claim the benefit of issues adjudicated successfully by the one
primarily liable. 236 So if an injured person sues an employee and losesthe employee having been found not negligent-and if the injured
person next sues the employer-who has only vicarious liability for the
tort of the employee-then the employer can claim the issue-preclusive
benefit of the employee's judgment, even though it would not have been
bound had the employee lost. Courts built on this justifiable secondaryliability extension, so as to allow preclusion in a range of facially similar
situations involving some sort of derivative liability.237
Eventually, most American jurisdictions have come to reject
mutuality of estoppel much more completely. Thus, the modern view is
that a stranger may invoke collateral estoppel against a former party
(or privy). 238 Still, in an attempt to avoid real threats to fairness and
efficiency, courts apply the modern view with great flexibility. They
apply all the usual exceptions to issue preclusion. 239 Additionally, courts
exercise discretion to deny preclusion when the former party lacked a
full and fair opportunity, or incentive, to litigate in the initial action or
when all the circumstances otherwise justify allowing the former party
to relitigate the issue. 240 Factors affecting that discretion include among
many others: (1) whether there is some reason to suspect the accuracy
of the prior determination, such as where it is inconsistent with some
other adjudication of the same issue (a factor partially solving the
"multiple-plaintiff anomaly," where a string of potential plaintiffs sue
an alleged mass tortfeasor seriatim until one wins and theoretically so
triggers collateral estoppel for all the future plaintiffs, thus creating an
incentive for the most sympathetic plaintiffs to sue first and a
disincentive for all plaintiffs to join in a single lawsuit); (2) whether the

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.

See id. § 93 & cmt. b.
See id.
See id.
See id. §§ 96-97.
See id. §§ 96-97, 99.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (AM. LAW INST. 1982).
Id. § 28.
Id. § 29.
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former party did not choose the occasion, adversary, and forum for the
initial action (so extending some needed extra protection to former
defendants); and (3) whether the stranger could reasonably have been
expected to join or intervene in the initial action (although in fact courts
24 1
have seldom invoked this as a factor).
To summarize, the law faced a basic choice between the rule of
mutuality, with a few defined extensions for derivative liability, and the
rule of nonmutuality, with lots of mainly fuzzy exceptions. Most
American jurisdictions chose the latter approach, meaning that today a
stranger can widely invoke nonmutual collateral estoppel, subject to
242
full-and-fair-opportunity-like exceptions.
Was this modern choice of nonmutuality a good one? No. 243 The
rationale behind nonmutuality is that the former party is entitled to
only one opportunity to litigate an issue, regardless of any change in
adversaries, and so should be able to inflict no more litigation. 244 But
perhaps this rationale elevates simplistic notions of efficiency over real
concerns of fairness and substantive policy: (1) Nonmutuality may
inefficiently discourage plaintiffs from joining in a single lawsuit, and
stimulate overlitigation during the initial action in anticipation of
possible preclusion, as well as impose extra litigation about the flexible
application of res judicata in the subsequent action. (2) Fairness argues
for treating a decision between specific litigants as a contextual truth
with limited effect, rather than as a determinate truth that free-floats
to conclusiveness in all other contexts. (3) Most fundamentally,
nonmutuality destroys the equivalence of litigating risk by weighting
the scale against the common party, and so undercuts the most basic of
the procedural system's rules, namely, procedure should provide a level
playing field. Take mass tort as an example: the first plaintiff risks
losing only the one case, which is all the defendant can win; meanwhile,
the defendant risks losing all the cases at once; the first plaintiff
thereby acquires tremendous settlement leverage, while in the absence
of settlement he or she will face an opponent willing to litigate down to
the scorched earth; and the defendant faces, over the series of cases,
overwhelmingly unfavorable odds. This fundamental departure from
procedural neutrality will inevitably have many unintended
substantive effects.

241.
242.
243.
244.
1982).

Id.
See id. § 29 reporter's note.
See CASAD & CLERMONT, supranote 1, at 184-88.
-See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 & cmts. a, b (AM. LAW INST.

1122

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAWREVIEW[Vol. 68:1067

Interestingly, besides just leaving the whole matter to the parties'
settlement in light of prior outcomes, other ways exist to achieve
nonmutuality's aim to eliminate relitigation. The most mainstream
alternative would be to expand mandatory joinder of the concerned
persons. This route would efficiently dispose of common matters in one
shot, but in a fair shot. The joined parties would be bound, but only
after being heard. Their common opponent would be bound if it lost, but
if it won it would win against all the joined parties. By so equating the
parties' litigating risk, this procedural technique would restore
procedural neutrality. Nevertheless, society has chosen, after balancing
benefits and costs, to follow this mandatory joinder route no farther
than provisions such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 on
compulsory joinder go. Because society has in fact chosen not to pursue
this joinder alternative, the choice by the courts to adopt on their own
the inferior reform of nonmutuality looks even more questionable.
C. Jurisdictionto Determine Jurisdiction
The United States likes res judicata so much that it has formulated
a third branch, one that is not necessary but one that some other
countries have adopted in a limited form. It applies to an attack on a
judgment, not in the ordinary course of review in the trial and appellate
courts, but in subsequent litigation. 24 5 It addresses what effect the
rendering court's determination rejecting a defense of subject-matter
jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction, or adequate notice should have on
246
that later attack.
This is a different kind of question from those posed in claim and
issue preclusion: it does not involve preclusive use of a valid judgment,
but instead involves preclusive use of prior determinations in order to
establish validity. 247 In this setting, the U.S. desire for finality generally
outweighs its concern for validity, giving the determination preclusive
effect and thus generating a special variety of res judicata called
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.248 That is to say, an affirmative
ruling on jurisdiction or notice can foreclose relitigation of that ruling

245.
246.

See id. §§ 10(2), 12.
See id.

247. Kevin M. Clermont, Sequencing the Issues for Judicial Decisonmaking:
Limitations from JurisdictionalPrimacy and IntrasuitPreclusion, 63 FLA. L. REV. 301,
316 (2011).
248. Id.
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and so preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment on
249
that ground in subsequent litigation.
On the one hand, this doctrine means that a court has jurisdiction
to decide whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over a case
presented to it.250 Its final ruling on that question, even if erroneous,
will be binding unless set aside on appeal and will have preclusive
effect on a later attack. 251 Indeed, because supposedly the court always
implicitly determines unraised subject-matter jurisdiction to exist in
any action litigated to judgment by some contesting parties, this
implicit determination has that same preclusive effect. However, an
explicit or implicit finding of the existence of subject-matter jurisdiction
will not preclude the parties from attacking the resultant judgment on
that ground in special circumstances, such as where the first court
plainly lacked subject-matter jurisdiction or where the judgment
252
substantially infringes on the authority of another court or agency.
On the other hand, a finding of the existence of territorial
jurisdiction or of adequate notice precludes the appearing parties from
attacking the resultant judgment in subsequent litigation. 253 Indeed,
upon a challenge in the initial action to the existence of either
territorial jurisdiction or adequate notice, an affirmative final ruling of
valid service precludes the defendant from attacking the resultant
judgment on either ground in subsequent litigation. 254 That is, if the
court rules that the requisites of territorial jurisdiction or adequate
notice are present, the defendant will be bound by that ruling of valid
service, whether the defendant participates further or not.255 If the
ruling is not set aside on appeal, it will be binding, and the territorial
jurisdiction and adequate notice issues cannot again be litigated in
256
attacking the judgment.
This doctrine of jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction really is a
third body of res judicata law, separate from claim and issue preclusion.
It is obviously similar to issue preclusion, but it differs in several
respects. 257 First, issue preclusion requires a valid prior judgment.255
249.
250.

Id.
Id. at 315-17; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 cmt. c (AM.

LAW INST. 1982).
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Clermont, supranote 247, at 315-17.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 12(1)-(2) (AM. LAw INST. 1982).
Id. § 10(2).
Id.
See id.
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Clermont, supranote 247, at 318.
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Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction does not require validity, but
instead works to make invulnerable what could otherwise be an invalid
judgment. Second, issue preclusion applies only in a subsequent action,
and so does not apply on a motion for relief from judgment, which is
technically a continuation of the initial action. 259 Jurisdiction to
determine jurisdiction, however, does apply to preclude a validity attack
by such a motion, as well as by the other methods for relief from
judgment. 260 Third, issue preclusion usually does not work to bind the
party prevailing on the issue. Jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction will
preclude the successful plaintiff if the unsuccessful defendant would be
precluded on the jurisdiction or notice issue. Fourth, issue preclusion
applies only to issues actually litigated and determined. 261 Jurisdiction
to determine jurisdiction sometimes applies to issues of subject-matter
jurisdiction that were not litigated at all. 262 Fifth, and most
importantly, special policies and concerns are at work with respect to
the jurisdiction and notice defenses, so the law needs to develop special
rules and exceptions for jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction.
This third body of res judicata is a significant one in the context of
comparative study. What it does is cut back sharply on the theoretically
available grounds for relief from judgment. The three major grounds for
relief in U.S. law are lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, territorial
jurisdiction, or adequate notice. 263 But in reality most such attacks are
cut off, except in some default situations, by the operation of
jurisdiction to determine jurisdiction (and by the operation of waiver for
defendants who fail to raise lack of territorial jurisdiction or adequate
notice). This subdoctrine of res judicata precludes those attacks by
establishing that courts have authority to determine their own
judgments' validity. Thus, relief from judgment is fairly narrow in the
United States.
Passing beyond the res judicata effects of affirmative rulings on
forum-authority, what if the initial court decides that it lacks
jurisdiction or failed to give notice? That is, can a court, which is
admittedly without authority to enter a valid judgment, make any
rulings that have preclusive effect? Yes, under the so-called doctrine of
jurisdiction to determine no jurisdiction.
The initial court's ruling that it lacks authority will prevent a
second try that presents exactly the same issue. Common sense
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Id. § 27 & cmts. d, e.
See id. §§ 10(2), 12.
Id. § 27.
Id. § 12 cmt. d.
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supports preclusion on the threshold issue, in order to prevent the
plaintiff from suing repetitively. Thus, the court had authority to
determine its lack of authority. For such purposes, the prior judgment
is a valid one.
Of course, the dismissal of the initial action on such a threshold
defense does not generate a bar to a second action in an appropriate
court. Moreover, the initial court's ruling probably should have no res
judicata effects in such later action, whether to establish the
jurisdiction of the other court or to preclude an issue on the merits of
the same or any other claim. For these purposes, the prior judgment is
264
an invalid one.
V. CHINA: THE EXAMPLE OF NARROW EXTENT
China has four levels of courts, whose judges sit in collegial
panels. 265 The Chinese procedural system resembles the civil-law
model, with socialist touches and Chinese characteristics. Appeal is a de
novo trial, but lies only to the level just above where the case
originated. 266 The procuratorate is a set of prosecutorial offices at each
level, but it also acts as a state organ for legal supervision of all
267

courts.

I can begin consideration of Chinese res judicata law by ticking off
the same three incidental characteristics of a country's law on the
subject: (1) when a decision becomes final enough to generate
preclusion, (2) whether a judge will raise res judicata or the parties
must, and (3) whether the doctrine is inapplicable to certain procedural
or preliminary issues.
First, a final judgment is a prerequisite for the Chinese preclusion
rule to apply, just as is the validity of the judgment. 268 That is, a
judgment must be final, or "legally effective" as the Chinese phrase it,
to have res judicata effects. 269 China takes the approach common in the
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See Clermont, supranote 247, at 320.
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266. CONTEMPORARY CHINESE LAW, supranote 265, at 24.
267. See id. at 25-28.
268. Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China (promulgated
by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 5, 1979, effective Jan. 1, 1980) art. 11,
http://www.npc.gov.cnlenglishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384078.htm.
269. Id.

1126

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 68:1067

civil law that a judgment does not become final until it is no longer
270
subject to appeal.
Second, Chinese res judicata law is self-executing. Like an
inquisitorial civil-law judge, Chinese judges should raise preclusion sua
271
sponte.
Third, Chinese law, like the U.S. law, does not treat specially
certain kinds of issues or draw the fine distinctions that bedevil the
typical civil-law res judicata law. But unlike the U.S. law, Chinese res
judicata law's smoothness is likely owing to its undeveloped state.
Moreover, the Chinese courts share the civil-law trait of looking to the
legislature for the general framework of the doctrine. They have not
gone far in elaborating the doctrine.
A. Robust Relief from Judgment
At first glance, China might seem to fall perilously close to the
practice of the rabbinical courts. 272 It downplays the role of res judicata
273
by expanding relief from judgment.
The main avenue to downplaying finality in this way runs through
its so-called trial supervision procedure. 274 This avenue allows what

270. See id.; Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Aug. 31, 2012) art. 175
[hereinafter Civil Procedure Law], http://www.inchinalaw.com/wp-contentluploads/
2013/09/PRC-Civil-Procedure-Law-2012.pdf; JIE HUANG, INTERREGIONAL RECOGNITION
AND ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS 191 (2014) ("In Mainland
China, a judgment becomes final when all appeals are exhausted or parties do not appeal
within the time set by the statute . . . . Judgments of the Supreme People's Court are
final."). As for the effect of the new trial procedure, execution on the judgment can proceed
until an actual decision to retry is made. See Civil Procedure Law, supra, arts. 199, 206.
271. See HUANG, supra note 270, at 244.
272. See supra text accompanying note 127.
273. See Nanping Liu, A Vulnerable Justice: Finalityof Civil Judgements in China, 13
COLUM. J. AsIAN L. 35, 35-36 (1999).
274. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 270, arts. 198-213; Supreme People's Court
Provisions on Strict Application of Ordering Retrials and Remand for New Trial in Civil
Trial Supervision Work (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Feb. 2, 2015),
http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/retrial/ (attempting to standardize retrial practice);
Shizhou Wang, People's Republic of China, in 2 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS:
CIVIL PROCEDURE
235-239 (Piet Taelman ed., 2014). Russia does the same. See Dmitry
Maleshin, The Russian Style of Civil Procedure, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 543, 550-55
(2007) (discussing its aggressive relief from judgment via a supervisory procedure);
Trofimov, supra note 123,
363-371. Russia is seemingly the source of the Chinese
procedure. See Zhong Jianhua & Yu Guanghua, Establishing the Truth on Facts:Has the
Chinese Civil Process Achieved This Goal?, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POLY 393, 422, 427
(2004).
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seems to be almost a perpetual inquiry into validity. 275 First, generally
within six months of a judgment becoming final, 276 a party can petition
a deciding court (trial or appellate) or a higher court for a new trial.277
The retrial will be before a different collegial panel of the court, or more
often before the higher court or its designated court. 278 Second, without
time limit, the procuratorate, on petition by a party or on its own, can
request or demand a retrial. 27 9 Third, without time limit, the court or a
280
higher court can decide on its own to order a retrial.
The grounds for ordering a new trial constitute a long but not
unlimited list. They appear in article 200 of the Chinese Civil Procedure
Law:
(1) There is new evidence which is conclusive enough to overrule
the original judgment or ruling;
(2) The [basic facts] used in the original judgment or ruling to
find the facts was insufficient;
(3) The main evidence used in the original judgment or ruling to
find the facts was forged;
(4) The main evidence used in the original judgment or ruling to
find the facts was not cross-examined;

275. Lawmakers have trended over recent years consistently to restrict retrials and
increasingly to respect the finality of judgments. For instance, the Supreme People's
Court is clamping down on repetitive petitions by the parties. See Supreme People's Court
Interpretation on the Application of the "Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of
China" (promulgated by the Sup. People's Ct., Jan. 30, 2015) art. 383,
http://chinalawtranslate.com/en/spccivilprovedurelawint/. There now can be only one
retrial. See HUANG, supra note 270, at 203.
276. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 270, art. 205. Until 2012, the period had been
two years. See Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China (2007 Amendment)
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 1,
2008) art.
184
[hereinafter
Civil
Procedure
Law
(2007
Amendment)],
http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=6459&lib=law;
WEI LUO, THE CIvIL
PROCEDURE LAw AND COURT RULES OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 182, at 100
(2006) (setting out the 1991 version of the civil procedure law).
277. Civil Procedure Law, supranote 270, art. 199. On the one hand, the parties cannot
petition as to a judgment on dissolution of marriage. Id. art. 202. On the other hand, even
affected third parties can sue, generally within six months, to alter or revoke a judgment.
See id. art. 56(3); Supreme People's Court Interpretation on the Application of the "Civil
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China," supra note 275, art. 300.
278. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 270, arts. 204, 207.
279. See id. arts. 208, 209.
280. See id. art. 198.
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(5) The parties "concerned are unable to collect the main
evidence of the case by themselves for objective reasons and
apply for help to the people's court, but the people's court fails to
collect such evidence;
(6) There was an error in the application of the law in the
original judgment or ruling;
(7) The trial organization was unlawfully formed or the
adjudicators that should withdraw have not done so;
(8) The person incapable of action is not represented by a legal
agent, or the party that should participate in the litigation
failed to do so because of the reasons not attributable to himself
or his legal agent;
(9) The party's right to debate was deprived of in violation of the
law;
(10) The default judgment in the absence of the party was made
whereas that party was not served with summons;
(11) Some claims were omitted or exceeded in the original
judgment or ruling;
(12) The legal document on which the original judgment or
ruling was made is cancelled or revised; or
(13) The judicial officers have committed embezzlement,
accepted bribes, engaged in malpractices for personal benefits or
281
perverted the course of law when trying the case.
On the one hand, it is surprising to allow reopening a case for mere
errors of fact and law (as opposed to newly discovered evidence). 28 2 In

281. Id. art. 200; cf. Civil Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China 2012
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Aug.
31,
2012)
art.
200,
translated
by
http://wenku.baidu.comviewfbf0ffb4de45c3b3567ec8b62.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2016)
(providing a slightly different translation, justifying my using "basic facts" rather than
"main evidence" in article 200(2)). It is possible to read "basic facts" to mean only facts
regarding the parties' identities, rights, obligations, and responsibilities and the nature of
the case. HUANG, supra note 270, at 194-95.
282. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 270, art. 200(2), (6). The Supreme People's
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the rest of the world the principle of finality trumps the desire to get
every case decided correctly, but the Chinese would rather say "truth is
truth" than "enough is enough." On the other hand, noticeably absent
from China's current list is the lack of jurisdiction. The idea here is that
China is a unitary country, so that at least for domestic cases the court
without jurisdiction would have been applying the same law anyway. 283
Before concluding that China's trial supervision scheme completely
undercuts res judicata, one should note that all countries have a scheme
for relief from judgment, and some are quite liberal. 2 4 Moreover, relief

Court has interpreted the meaning of error of law:
The court shall consider there was an erroneous application of law in the original
judgment or ruling as provided in article 200(6) of the Civil Procedure Law if any
of the following circumstances exist:
(1) the content of the law does not strongly match the matter of the
case;
(2) the liability decided by the judges represents deals between the
parties, or is against the law;
(3) the applied law is invalid or not yet valid;
(4) violates the rule of retroactive effect;
(5) violates the rule of law application;
(6) goes against the obvious purpose of the lawmaker.
Supreme People's Court Interpretation on the Application of the "Civil Procedure Law of
the People's Republic of China," supra note 275, art. 390 (translation by Man Li, on file
with author).
283. See HUANG, supra note 270, at 194 n.197. However, article 179(7) of the 2007
version of the civil procedure law did provide for relief if: "The jurisdiction was in
violation of legal provisions and was improper." Civil Procedure Law (2007 Amendment),
supranote 276, art. 179(7).
284. See, for example, FED. R. Civ. P. 60, which in part provides:
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion
and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic),
misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged; it is based
on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying
it prospectively is no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
(c) Timing and Effect of the Motion.
(1) Timing. A motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a
reasonable time-and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year
after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.
(2) Effect on Finality. The motion does not affect the judgment's
finality or suspend its operation.
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from judgment under China's trial supervision scheme is actually
uncommon. 28 5 Thus, its scheme is not as extreme as it first appears. "It
is argued that the purpose of the trial supervision regime is not to
defeat the finality and binding effect of a judgment, but to provide a
judicial remedy in exceptional circumstances in which the decision is
28 6
intolerably wrong."
Nonetheless, so far this summary of China's procedure has said
nothing of the extra-judicial petitioning processes that the Communists
instituted beginning in the 1950s. Most important is the heavily used
Xinfang (letters and visits), an administrative review by which one can
more or less endlessly petition designated governmental bureaus to
push for relief from judgment. 28 7 This Xinfang system, aimed at

(d) Other Powers to Grant Relief. This rule does not limit a court's
power to:
(1) entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a
judgment, order, or proceeding;
(2) grant relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1655 to a defendant who was not
personally notified of the action; or
(3) set aside a judgment for fraud on the court.
It provides extraordinary relief, not correction of mere errors. The most important ground
is being "void," which means a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, territorial jurisdiction,
or adequate notice. See CLERMONT, supra note 5, at 381-86; Herzog & Karlen, supra note
85, at 3-9.
285. Fewer than one percent of cases are retried in this way, and a good majority of
those cases are upheld. See HUANG, supra note 270, at 203-06; Jie Huang, Conflicts
Between Civil Law and Common Law in Judgment Recognition and Enforcement: When Is
the Finality Dispute Final?, 29 WIS. INT'L L.J. 70, 90-94 (2011). But statistics can be
misleading. Almost all retrials are directed at second-instance judgments, not firstinstance judgments. See HUANG, supra note 270, at 205-06. As a percentage of secondinstance judgments, retrials are a much bigger percentage. See Fu Yulin, Comparative
Research on Judicial Hierarchy, SOC. SCI. IN CHINA, Spring 2003, at 39, 39 n.1 (giving
twenty-five percent as that percentage for 1999).
286. Lu Song, The EOS Engineering Corporation Case and the Nemo Debet Bis Vexari
Pro Una et Eadem Causa Principle in China, 7 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 143, 154-55 (2008)
("Accordingly, the trial supervision regime, which reflects Chinese public policy, does not
frustrate the finality and conclusiveness of judgments in civil litigation in a legal sense.
One may say that this system strikes a delicate balance between the finality and
conclusiveness of a judgment and the demand of fundamental justice in any dispute
adjudication.").
287. See Benjamin L. Liebman, A Populist Threat to China's Courts?, in CHINESE
JUSTICE 269, 270 (Margaret Y.K. Woo & Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011) (arguing that this
system results "in courts that are extremely responsive to populist pressures, perhaps to
the detriment of adherence to rule of law principles"); Carl F. Minzner, Xinfang: An
Alternative to Formal Chinese Legal Institutions, 42 STAN. J. INT'L L. 103, 130 (2006)
("Xinfang regulations avoid bright lines regarding the finality of decisions."); Taisu
Zhang, Why the Chinese Public Prefer Administrative Petitioning over Litigation, 3
SHEHUI
XUE
YANJIU
(SOCIOLOGICAL
STUD.)
139
(Apr.
20,
2009),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098417 (chronicling public distaste and distrust of current court
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ensuring social stability, puts considerable outside pressure on judges
to revise judgments, either through the trial supervision procedure or
by other means. 288 The result may be judgments revised to correct mere
28 9
error or changed even in the absence of error.
It is thus hard to deny that China appears more interested in
getting things resolved in a certain way than in putting an end to
litigation. To understand its pursuit of that interest, one must consider
the broader Chinese context. Possible explanations for its robust
scheme for relief from judgment abound. First, the explanation could be
internal to the procedural system. For example, one brilliant analysis
sees Chinese relief from judgment as serving as a kind of further appeal
and, indeed, as compensating for the stunted system of appeal that
exists today. 290 Thus, reform of appellate review would allow restricting
later attacks on judgments. Second, the explanation could link to the
role of courts in China. Courts there are not especially competent or
neutral; moreover, they are weak, being susceptible to public opinion
and arguably serving as clumsy tools of the government in imposing its
will to rule.291 Thus, one would expect China to have a robust scheme
for relief from judgment, whereby courts can give relief from judgment
other than on behalf of a party and also nonjudicial officials can impose
relief from judgment. Third, the explanation could be more broadly
cultural. From Confucianism to Marxism, the Chinese have felt the
urge to seek endlessly the right answer, while believing that no earthly
authority has the capacity to give a final and correct answer. 292 Thus,

procedure).
288. See Liebman, supranote 287, at 289.
289. Id. ("Some judges acknowledge ignoring the law on the books or reaching strained
interpretations of the law to assuage petitioners."); Minzner, supra note 287, at 129, 134,
172.
290. See Fu, supranote 285.
291. See Liebman, supra note 287, at 307 ("The influence of petitioning on the courts
reflects the perseverance of problems that undermine court authority, including the
continued legitimacy of official interference, lack of finality, and courts' close ties to local
authorities.'); Liu, supra note 273, at 90 (noting that the "quality of judges is still a
problem"; "the Chinese court has historically never been treated as a real judicial
institution"; and "it is Party policy, not the law, that regulates Chinese society").
292. See Yu Xingzhong, Nonfinality, "Lord Blue-Heaven," and the Superjudge Hercules:
On the Traditional Chinese Concept of Justice, J. HANGZHOU NORMAL UNIV. (Soc. SCI.),
May 2012, at 102, 104 (article in Chinese, but English version on file with author); cf. Liu,
supra note 273, at 89 ("[I]t is simply impossible to achieve genuine judicial finality in
Communist China.'); id. at 91 ("Therefore, if the application of any facts or law is found to
be in error, a people's court is obliged to make corrections ...at any other stage."); Zhong
& Yu, supra note 274, at 433-38 (elaborating Chinese preference for "substantive truth
over procedural value").
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Chinese courts could ironically fall into a position analogous to religious
courts, and res judicata could appear to be peculiarly un-Chinese.
Seeking the explanation for China's robust scheme for relief from
judgment takes me far away from the heart of the subject of res
judicata. Anyway, the quest might be impossible, and certainly it is for
an outsider like me. Still, whether its origins are fully understood or
not, the extent of relief from judgment in general is relevant to the task
at hand: laying out the Chinese law of res judicata. Recall that the
easier it is to get relief from judgment, the less bite the rules of
preclusion will have.
B. Bare Preclusion
The Chinese Civil Procedure Law does not use any linguistic
counterpart in Chinese of "res judicata." That said, in the list of cases
that courts must not accept, article 124(5) provides:
For cases in which a judgment, a ruling, or a mediation decision
has become legally effective, if either party files another suit,
the court shall advise that party to apply for a retrial instead.
This, however, does not include a prior ruling in which the court
293
allowed withdrawal of suit.
So if a party tries to file a case that has already been decided, the
second court will refuse to accept the case and tell the party that it may
file a petition to reopen the case under the trial supervision procedure.
Giving advice to parties is not at all unusual, as Chinese courts follow
the civil-law elucidation principle whereby the court will undertake to
keep the parties on the right track. Indeed, the first court may very well
have advised the parties in the prior litigation not to omit any part of
294
their claim or defense.
While recognizing that case law is not a formal source of law in
China, one should nevertheless note that the Supreme People's Court
has spoken on how to read article 124(5). In its 2003 decision in the
EOS Engineering Corporationcase, the court applied the statute rather
broadly. 295 The decision demonstrates that the country adheres in both

293. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 270, art. 124(5) (translation by Frank Zhang, on
file with author). The provision is substantially the same as article 111(5) in the 2007 and
1991 versions of the civil procedure law.
294. See Lu, supra note 286, at 152-54.
295. EOS Eng'g Corp. v. Xinjiang Elec. Prod. Co., 10 SUP. PEOPLE'S CT. GAZ. 21 (Sup.
People's Ct. 2003).
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legal theory and actual practice to "the principle of 'one matter is not to
be tried twice"' 296-- even if everyone acknowledges that nowhere in
Chinese legislation can one find the elements or scope of this no-doubleadjudication principle.
In the EOS case, the American plaintiff made a $1 million deposit
with the Chinese defendants' agent in connection with construction of a
power plant, but the money disappeared. 297 The plaintiff sued for unjust
enrichment.298 The plaintiff prevailed in the High People's Court of
Shanxi Province. 299 Upon appeal, the Supreme People's Court
remanded for reconsideration.3 00 The lower court then dismissed on the
ground there was no unjust enrichment of the defendants. 301 The
30 2
plaintiff appealed, but later withdrew its appeal.
The next year the plaintiff brought a new suit for tort against the
same defendants in the same court based on the same facts. 30 3 This
time the High People's Court dismissed on the basis of article 124(5).304
The Supreme People's Court affirmed. 305 The holding, then, was that
shifting the legal theory or grounds, or the arguments or relief, did not
create a different claim outside the no-double-adjudication principle.
Instead, the measure of the barred claim would be tied to the factual
dispute between the parties. The elements of the no-double-adjudication
principle "are (i) whether the parties are identical in the two related
proceedings and (ii) whether the particular substantive [i.e., factual]
dispute is the same in the two related proceedings." 306 The second court
will not accept a dispute between the parties that has already been
decided by the first court.
It was at least arguable that this "same dispute" test could be
analogous to the United States' transactional approach. 30 7 But
unsurprisingly, the Supreme People's Court, following the socialist
tradition of guiding explanations, 308 has since issued an official "judicial
296. Lu, supra note 286, at 151.
297. Id. at 149.
298. Id. at 150.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 157.
307. See id. at 152 (stating that the new "same dispute" test differs from the test
previously "advanced by Chinese academic thought).
308. See Quigley, supra note 122, at 792; Marcus Wang, Dancing with the Dragon:
What U.S. Parties Should Know About Chinese Law When Drafting a ContractualDispute
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interpretation" of the Chinese Civil Procedure Law that argues against
a broad reading. 30 9 It interpreted same dispute to mean something like
310
the civil law's requirement of same parties, ground, and demand:
The litigation shall be considered repetitive if the following
circumstances exist when the parties bring a new litigation with
the same matter as another litigation that is pending or legally
effective already:
(1) the parties of the two litigations are the same;
(2) the subject matters of the two litigations are the
same;
(3) the second suit seeks the same relief as the first suit,
or the relief in the second suit would substantively
negate the results of the first suit.
When the litigation is considered repetitive, the court shall
issue a ruling to refuse to accept the case, or issue a ruling to
dismiss the action if it was accepted already, except as
otherwise provided in laws and judicial interpretations. 311
If one were to analogize to the civil law's requirements, the "subject
matter" or legal relationship would refer to the legal principle upon
which the action is grounded, and the "relief' would refer to the remedy
or end demanded.
One scholar describes the policies underlying the no-doubleadjudication principle in this way:
The Principle is of obvious value and significance in the
legal and commercial world, as it is a reflection of the public
interests of a State in modern society. First, litigation shall not
drag on forever and there shall be an end to any dispute
adjudication in order to maintain stability of the social and
economic life of the people. And efforts shall be made to attempt
to solve any dispute that comes to a court of law once and for

Resolution Clause, 29 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 309, 310-11 (2009).
309. See Supreme People's Court Interpretation on the Application of the "Civil
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China," supra note 275.
310. See supranote 106 and accompanying text.
311. Supreme People's Court Interpretation on the Application of the "Civil Procedure
Law of the People's Republic of China," supra note 275, art. 247 (translation by Man Li
and Frank Zhang, on file with author).
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all. Disputes adjudged should not be permitted to retrial unless
in exceptional cases.
Secondly, the principle of non-double adjudication aims at
avoiding conflicting or irreconcilable judgments resulting from
separate proceedings....
Thirdly, saving legal resources and reduction of court
312
caseload is another major purpose of applying the principle.
So, putting legislation, case, judicial interpretation, and policy
together, it appears that China has res judicata similar in effect to that
of the civil law. First, as to formulation, China uses bar and defense
preclusion, precluding claims and defenses arising from the same
dispute. China thus delivers the minimal core of res judicata law.
Second, as to merger, the legislation's wording implies that China
might prohibit the winning plaintiff from suing again. However, a few
civil-law countries such as Germany have not fully embraced merger
despite having a similar code provision, because they read the code as
more for blocking losers than winners. 313 Third, China does not employ
issue preclusion. 314 But, in the civil-law style, 315 China does allow the
3 16
evidential use of prior judgments.
The lawmakers have not worked out the details of Chinese res
judicata, including the status of merger. Both the reach of privity and
the application of exceptions, such as the statutory off-the-merits
exception for "a prior ruling in which the court allowed withdrawal of
317
suit," have yet to be worked out.
Nonetheless, China has a solid foundation of res judicata law. Like
its Asian neighbors, 318 it has delivered the minimal core of res judicata
by the more straightforward and comprehensible route of claim
312. Lu, supranote 286, at 145.
313. See supra notes 105 & 110 and accompanying text.
314. See Liu, supra note 273, at 53-54.
315. See supratext accompanying note 115.
316. See Supreme People's Court Interpretation on the Application of the "Civil
Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China," supra note 275, art. 93(5); Some
Provisions of the Supreme People's Court on Evidence in Civil Procedures (revised by the
Ct.,
Dec. 31, 2008), art. 9(4), http://www.lawinfochina.com/
Sup. People's
display. aspx?lib=law&id=2197&CGid=.
317. Civil Procedure Law, supra note 270, art. 124(5); see also WENLIANG ZHANG,
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN CHINA 37 (2014) ("There is

no systematic clarification made by Chinese law in regard to the effects Chinese
judgments can produce .. ");Lu, supra note 286, at 152 n.38, 157.
318. See supra notes 121 & 123 and accompanying text.

1136

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW[Vol. 68:1067

preclusion rather than issue preclusion. With that formulation, China
seems to extend preclusion for valid and final judgments as far as civillaw countries like Germany. 319 For illustration, the EOS case would
turn out the same way in Germany today, 320 as the change of legal
theory would not raise a different "subject matter of the controversy" or

Streitgegenstand.321 Still, if one considers relief from judgment in
conjunction with preclusion rules, China has a less extensive res
judicata law than Germany and the other civil-law countries.

C. Room for Growth
This overview of Chinese res judicata might prompt the concern
that China has too little res judicata as a matter of justice. Res judicata
is, after all, a necessary component of every system of justice. If China
were to grow its res judicata, the preceding two sections mark two paths
along which growth might occur: narrowing the grounds for relief from
judgment and broadening preclusion flowing from both the claim
preclusion it has and the issue preclusion it does not have.
1.

Narrowing Relief from Judgment

Even though China's loose restrictions on challenging a judgment's
validity by seeking relief from judgment may be inherent to the Chinese
procedural outlook, it is this aspect of res judicata that attracts the
most criticism in case and commentary. 322 As a reform, consider
restricting the trial supervision system.3 23 Some argue that the door is
so open to challenges that any pretense of finality is compromised.
Others counterargue that the mere existence of a retrial system to
correct error does not frustrate finality. Debate centers on whether the
current retrial system has struck the optimal balance. Others have
suggested moving retrials more exclusively to higher courts. 324 More

319. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
320. See MURRAY & STURNER, supra note 102, at 358; Zeuner & Koch, supra note 27, §§
9-63 to -64 (explaining that this expansion of German res judicata is a recent
development).
321. MURRAY & STflRNER, supranote 102, at 357.
322. See, e.g., Chiyu Banking Corp. v. Chan Tin Kwun, [1996] 2 H.K.L.R. 395 (H.C.);
ZHANG, supra note 317, at 78-84.
323. Likewise, the path to administrative relief from judgment premised on mere error
or less should probably continue toward closure. But socially a change to Xinfang would
be much harder to accomplish. See Minzner, supra note 287, at 136 ('The xinfang system
may be in the middle of a long process of evolution rather than replacement.").
324. See HUANG, supra note 270, at 213-15.
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obviously, China should clarify the meaning of the terms used in
325
describing the grounds for relief.
I would add to the debate the dimension of whether Chinese relief
from judgment is so extensive as to defeat the essential core of bar and
defense preclusion. This consideration should perhaps push China to
restrict its scheme for retrial. My view is that the list of grounds should
be both legislatively shortened and judicially interpreted in a restrictive
way. Of course, suggestions for reform coming from outside, especially
for a legal system as complex as China's, should be taken lightly.
My premise again is that relief from judgment should provide a
corrective only for fundamental flaws, not for mere errors. 326 This line
between fundamental error and mere error must be drawn to avoid
defeating the core of bar and defense preclusion. In the Chinese trial
supervision procedure, its allowing correction of the prior judgment for
mere errors of fact or law seems to cross that line. Subdivisions 200(2)
and 200(6) misconceive the idea of relief from judgment and should thus
be dropped.
More broadly, the list of grounds should cover only extraordinarily
significant failures. It is for the particular society to decide which
failures are significant enough, but an outsider might think that the
denial of the right to cross-examine or to argue could be left to an
adequate system of appeal. 327 In the United States, one can argue for
relief from judgment on the ground of failure to receive notice, but one
cannot argue for relief on the ground that the prior court otherwise
denied procedural due process, even though the U.S. legal system
sanctifies due process as the absolute floor of fundamental fairness.
U.S. courts give no relief because they believe that the notified party
could have remedied such denials of due process by taking an appeal.
Furthermore, the fact that "[s]ome claims were omitted or exceeded
in the original judgment or ruling" 328 hardly seems a ground for a
belated new trial. A claim omitted by the judges would seem an
appropriate exception to claim preclusion, while an exceeding of the
asserted claims would require nothing more than its being a ground for
329
appeal.

325. See id. at 194-95.
326. See Fu, supra note 285, at 43 ("Exceptional remedies are facilities like 'fire exits'
or 'emergency exits' in buildings [and therefore] no threat to the structure of the judicial
hierarchy.").
327. See Civil Procedure Law, supra note 270, art. 200(4), (9).

328. Id. art. 200(11).
329.

See HUANG, supranote 270, at 194.
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If the list of grounds for relief from judgment were pruned, then
China's res judicata would look much like the rest of the legal world's.
Of course, this prescription rests on an assumption that China wants to
move in that direction. On the one hand, it could be that the
government and the people of China do not want court-like courts:
Courts are evolving, but not necessarily toward a Western-style
system. The influence of petitioning shows that courts remain
subject to extensive external pressures, continue to play a range
of roles in addition to deciding cases, and do not appear to be
distinguishing themselves from other state institutions in the
330
minds of those who use the courts.
On the other hand, the rule of law beckons the Chinese legal
community. "A final say on legal disputes is the most important test of
33 1
an independent judiciary in modern society."
Even if one cannot unearth all the reasons that China has such
robust relief from judgment, and even if one does not account for the
country's internal struggles to control the direction of reform, one can
say that if China were to decide fully to embrace an effective rule of
law-once the political will and technical skills for it are in placeChina must deliver the core of res judicata. And to do so, it must
restrict relief from judgment sufficiently so as not to defeat that
essential core of bar and defense preclusion.
2.

Broadening Preclusion

One can argue that Chinese law has inadequately formalized res
judicata, fixed its reach, and eliminated its ambiguities. 332 Yet, even
without these refinements, res judicata is undoubtedly recognized by
China today. Still, optimization would require unearthing and
theorizing the subject of res judicata. Lawmakers have to perceive the
law before they can improve it. Progress would come from the Chinese

330. Liebman, supranote 287, at 310.
331. Liu, supra note 273, at 97. Obviously, for China, a big issue of judicial
independence lurks in the background. If China were to aspire to a "thick" version of rule
of law, see HEAD, supra note 4, at 127-46, it would have to restrict relief from judgment
offered by nonjudicial officials.
332. See ZHANG, supra note 317, at 40-41 (describing thrust of recent scholarly
proposals for reform); Weng Xiao-bing, The Scopes of Res Judicata in China's Civil
Decisions, 26 MOD. L. SCI., Dec. 2004, no. 6, at 78 (abstract in English, but article in
Chinese), http://en.cnki.com.cn/Articleen/CJFDTOTAL-XDFX20040601l.htm.
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Civil Procedure Law being made more explicit or the Supreme People's
Court issuing another judicial interpretation.
Further, policy could argue for more than bare claim preclusion in
China, much as it has in many other countries. Comparative study
suggests that the optimum of res judicata law in any particular country
lies at least somewhat above the minimal core, and that over time
developed legal systems tend to expand their res judicata law. But they
do so as a matter of balancing their own efficiency, fairness, and
substantive policies.
In China, the two main routes to expansion involve broadening the
dimensions of a "claim" or adding to claim preclusion a separate body of
issue-preclusive law. First, the Supreme People's Court in 2015 refused
to broaden the dimensions of claim. Second, China now feels, probably
correctly given how the Chinese court system works, that it does not
need issue preclusion. Someday China might feel differently, so that it
would then elaborate and expand its res judicata law. Currently,
however, there is no need for China to broaden claim preclusion or
adopt issue preclusion and, in any event, no likelihood of movement in
those directions.
CONCLUSION

Looking at res judicata over history and across borders, one sees
that all systems of justice deliver a core comprising the substance of bar
and defense preclusion. This core does not represent a universal value
but rather responds to a universal institutional need. Such a system
must have adjudicators, and an effective adjudicator must have its
judgments mean something with bindingness. The minimal bindingness
is that, except in certain circumstances, the disgruntled cannot undo
the judgment in an effort to change the outcome. Hence the core of bar
and defense preclusion.
By some formulation, each justice system must deliver the core.
Context-specific policy will decide how much farther res judicata will go
in any particular country. The United States loves preclusion, and by
indulging in nonmutual preclusion it goes to an extreme well beyond
the bare minimum. Thus far, China sticks to the core, even endangering
it by indulging attacks on prior judgments' validity. Perhaps for both
countries, the optimum lies closer to the middle. Where each of the two
countries' law of res judicata will end up depends on local context,
which makes it safe to say that they will not and should not end up in
the same spot.

